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Abstract
In many important applications, a collection of mutually distrustful parties must perform
private computation over multisets. Each party’s input to the function is his private input mul-
tiset. In order to protect these private sets, the players perform privacy-preserving computation;
that is, no party learns more information about other parties’ private input sets than what can
be deduced from the result. In this paper, we propose eﬃcient techniques for privacy-preserving
operations on multisets. By employing the mathematical properties of polynomials, we build a
framework of eﬃcient, secure, and composable multiset operations: the union, intersection, and
element reduction operations. We apply these techniques to a wide range of practical problems,
achieving more eﬃcient results than those of previous work.
1 Introduction
Private computation over sets and multisets is required in many important applications. In the
real world, parties often resort to use of a trusted third party, who computes a ﬁxed function
on all parties’ private input multisets, or forgo the application altogether. This unconditional
trust is fraught with security risks; the trusted party may be dishonest or compromised, as it
is an attractive target. We design eﬃcient privacy-preserving techniques and protocols for com-
putation over multisets by mutually distrustful parties: no party learns more information about
other parties’ private input sets than what can be deduced from the result of the computation.
For example, to determine which airline passengers appear on a ‘do-not-ﬂy’ list, the airline
must perform a set-intersection operation between its private passenger list and the government’s
list. This is an example of the Set-Intersection problem. If a social services organization needs
to determine the list of people on welfare who have cancer, the union of each hospital’s lists of
cancer patients must be calculated (but not revealed), then an intersection operation between
the unrevealed list of cancer patients and the welfare rolls must be performed. This problem
may be eﬃciently solved by composition of our private union and set-intersection techniques.
Another example is privacy-preserving distributed network monitoring. In this scenario, each
node monitors anomalous local traﬃc, and a distributed group of nodes collectively identify
popular anomalous behaviors: behaviors that are identiﬁed by at least a threshold t number of
monitors. This is an example of the Over-Threshold Set-Union problem.
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Problem Complexity of Complexity of Complexity of
our solution previous solution general MPC
Set-Intersection (HBC) O(cnk lg|P|) O(n2klg|P|) [14] O(n2k polylog(k)lg |P|)
Set-Intersection (Malicious) O(n2k lg|P|) none O(n3k polylog(k)lg |P|)
Cardinality Set-Intersection (HBC) O(n2k lg|P|) none O(n2k polylog(k)lg |P|)
Over-Threshold Set-Union (HBC) O(n2k lg|P|) none O(n2k polylog(nk)lg|P|)
Threshold Set-Union (HBC) O(n2k lg|P|) none O(n2k polylog(nk)lg|P|)
Subset (HBC) O(k lg|P|) none O(k polylog(k)lg |P|)
Table 1: Total communication complexity comparison for our multiparty protocols, previous solu-
tions, and general multiparty computation. There are n ≥ 2 players, c < n dishonestly colluding,
each with an input multiset of size k. The domain of the multiset elements is P. Security parameters
are not included in the communication complexity.
Contributions. In this paper, we propose eﬃcient techniques for privacy-preserving opera-
tions on multisets. By building a framework of set operations using polynomial representations
and employing the mathematical properties of polynomials, we design eﬃcient methods to en-
able privacy-preserving computation of the union, intersection, and element reduction1 multiset
operations.
An important feature of our privacy-preserving multiset operations is that they can be com-
posed, and thus enable a wide range of applications. To demonstrate the power of our techniques,
we apply our operations to solve speciﬁc problems, including Set-Intersection, Cardinality Set-
Intersection, Over-Threshold Set-Union, and Threshold Set-Union, as well as determining the
Subset relation. Furthermore, we show that our techniques can be used to eﬃciently compute
the output of any function over multisets expressed in the following grammar, where s represents
any set held by some player and d ≥ 1:
Υ ::= s | Rdd(Υ) | Υ ∩ Υ | s ∪ Υ | Υ ∪ s
Note that any monotonic function over multisets2 can be expressed using our grammar, showing
that our techniques have truly general applicability. Finally, we show that our techniques are
applicable even outside the realm of set computation. As an example, we describe how to utilize
our techniques to eﬃciently and privately evaluate CNF boolean functions.
Our protocols are more eﬃcient than the results obtained from previous work. General mul-
tiparty computation is the best previous result for most of the problems that we address in this
paper. Only the private Set-Intersection problem and two-party Cardinality Set-Intersection
problem have been previously studied [14]. However, previous work only provides protocols
for 3-or-more-party Set-Intersection secure only against honest-but-curious players; it is not
obvious how to extend this work to achieve security against malicious players. Also, previous
work focuses on achieving results for the Set-Intersection problem in isolation – these techniques
cannot be used to compose set operations. In contrast, we provide eﬃcient solutions for private
multi-party Set-Intersection secure against malicious players, and our multiset intersection op-
erator can be easily composed with other operations to enable a wide range of eﬃcient private
computation over multisets. We compare the communication complexity of our protocols with
1The element reduction by d, Rdd(A), of a multiset A is the multiset composed of the elements of A such that for
every element a that appears in A at least d
′ > d times, a is included d
′ − d times in Rdd(A).
2Any function computed with only intersection and union, without use of an inverse operation.
2previous work and solutions based on general multiparty communication in Table 1. Note
that the techniques utilized to create the circuits for the general solution are both complex and
incur very large constants, on top of the constants inherent in the use of general multiparty
computation [2]; we thus achieve greater practical eﬃciency, as well as asymptotic eﬃciency.
Our protocols are provably secure in the PPT-bounded adversary model. We consider both
standard adversary models: honest-but-curious adversaries (HBC) and malicious adversaries.
For protocols secure in the HBC model, we prove that the information learned by any coalition of
honest-but-curious players is indistinguishable from the information learned in the ideal model,
where a trusted third party (TTP) calculates the function. For protocols secure in the malicious
model, we provide simulation proofs showing that for any strategy followed by a malicious
coalition Γ in the real protocol, there is a translated strategy they could follow in the ideal model,
such that, to Γ, the real execution is computationally indistinguishable from ideal execution.
Outline. We discuss related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce our adversary
models, as well as our cryptographic tools. We describe our privacy-preserving set operation
techniques in in Section 4. Section 5 gives protocols, secure against honest-but-curious players,
and security analysis for the Set-Intersection and Cardinality Set-Intersection problems. Section
6 gives protocols, secure against honest-but-curious players, and security analysis for the Over-
Threshold Set-Union problem, as well for several variants of the Threshold Set-Union problem.
We introduce techniques and protocols secure against malicious players for the Set-Intersection,
Cardinality Set-Intersection, and Over-Threshold Set-Union problems in Section 7. Finally,
we discuss several additional applications of our techniques in Section 8, including the subset
protocol, general privacy-preserving computation over sets, and evaluation of CNF boolean
formulas.
2 Related Work
For most of the privacy-preserving set function problems we address in this paper (except for
the Set-Intersection problem), the best previously known results are through general multiparty
computation. General two-party computation was introduced by Yao [29], and general compu-
tation for multiple parties was introduced in [3]. In general multiparty computation, the players
share the values of each input, and cooperatively evaluate the circuit. For each multiplication
gate, the players must cooperate to securely multiply their inputs and re-share the result, requir-
ing O(n) communication for honest-but-curious players and O(n2) communication for malicious
players [17]. Recent results that allow non-interactive private multiplication of shares [9] do not
extend to our adversary model, in which any c < n players may collude. Our results are more
eﬃcient than the general MPC approach; we compare communication complexity in Table 1.
The most relevant work to our paper is by Freedman, Nissim, and Pinkas (FNP) [14] and
Rakesh Agrawal and Alexandre Evﬁmievski and Ramakrishnan Srikant [1]. They proposed
protocols for problems related to two party Set-Intersection. FNP’s results are based on the
representation of sets as roots of a polynomial [14]. Their work does not utilize properties of
polynomials beyond evaluation at given points. We explore the power of polynomial represen-
tation of multisets, using operations on polynomials to obtain composable privacy-preserving
multisets operations. We give a more detailed comparison of our Set-Intersection protocol with
FNP in Table 1 and in Section 1.
Much work has been done in designing solutions for privacy-preserving computation of dif-
ferent functions. For example, private equality testing is the problem of set-intersection for the
case in which the size of the private input sets is 1. Protocols for this problem are proposed in
[11, 25, 23], and fairness is added in [4]. Another related problem is in testing the disjointness
of private input sets [21]; a restricted version of the Cardinality Set-Intersection problem. We
3do not enumerate the works of privacy-preserving computation of other functions here, as they
address drastically diﬀerent problems and cannot be applied to our setting.
3 Preliminaries
The notation used in this paper is described in Appendix A. In this section, we describe our
adversary models and the cryptographic tools used in this paper.
3.1 Adversary Models
In this paper, we consider two standard adversary models: honest-but-curious adversaries and
malicious adversaries. We provide intuition and informal deﬁnitions of these models; formal
deﬁnitions of these models can be found in [17].
Honest-But-Curious Adversaries. In this model, all parties act according to their pre-
scribed actions in the protocol. Security in this model is straightforward: no player or coalition
of c < n players (who cheat by sharing their private information) gains information about other
players’ private input sets, other than what can be deduced from the result of the protocol.
This is formalized by considering an ideal implementation where a trusted third party (TTP)
receives the inputs of the parties and outputs the result of the deﬁned function. We require that
in the real implementation of the protocol—that is, one without a TTP—each party does not
learn more information than in the ideal implementation.
Malicious Adversaries. In this model, an adversary may behave arbitrarily. In particular,
we cannot hope to prevent malicious parties from refusing to participate in the protocol, choosing
arbitrary values for its private input set, or aborting the protocol prematurely. Instead, we focus
on the standard security deﬁnition (see, e.g., [17]) which captures the correctness and the privacy
issues of the protocol. Informally, the security deﬁnition is based on a comparison between the
ideal model and a TTP, where a malicious party may give arbitrary input to the TTP. The
security deﬁnition is also limited to the case where at least one of the parties is honest. Let Γ be
the set of colluding malicious parties; for any strategy Γ can follow in the real protocol, there is
a translated strategy that it could follow in the ideal model, such that, to Γ, the real execution
is computationally indistinguishable from execution in the ideal model.
3.2 Additively Homomorphic Cryptosystem
In this paper we utilize a semantically secure [18], additively homomorphic public-key cryptosys-
tem. Let Epk( ) denote the encryption function with public key pk. The cryptosystem supports
the following operations, which can be performed without knowledge of the private key: (1)
Given the encryptions of a and b, Epk(a) and Epk(b), we can eﬃciently compute the encryption
of a+b, denoted Epk(a+b) := Epk(a) +h Epk(b); (2) Given a constant c and the encryption of
a, Epk(a), we can eﬃciently compute the encryption of ca, denoted Epk(c   a) := c ×h Epk(a).
When such operations are performed, we require that the resulting ciphertexts be re-randomized
for security. In re-randomization, a ciphertext is transformed so as to form an encryption of the
same plaintext, under a diﬀerent random string than the one originally used. We also require
that the homomorphic public-key cryptosystem support secure (n,n)-threshold decryption, i.e.,
the corresponding private key is shared by a group of n players, and decryption must be per-
formed by all players acting together. We also require that no PPT adversary can recover the
sizes of the subﬁelds of R with greater than negligible probability.
4In our protocols for the malicious case, we require: (1) the decryption protocol be secure
against malicious players, typically, this is done by requiring each player to prove in zero-
knowledge that he has followed the threshold decryption protocol correctly [16]; (2) eﬃcient
construction of zero-knowledge proofs of plaintext knowledge; (3) optionally, eﬃcient construc-
tion of certain zero-knowledge proofs, as detailed inSection 7.1.
Note that Paillier’s cryptosystem [27] satisﬁes each of our requirements: it is additively
homomorphic, supports ciphertexts re-randomization and threshold decryption (secure in the
malicious case) [12, 13], and allows certain eﬃcient zero-knowledge proofs (standard construc-
tions from [7, 5], and proof of plaintext knowledge [8]).
In the remainder of this paper, we simply use Epk( ) to denote the encryption function of
the homomorphic cryptosystem which satisﬁes all the aforementioned properties.
3.3 Shuﬄe Protocol
Each player i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) has a private input multiset Vi. We deﬁne the Shuﬄe problem as
follows: all players learn the joint multiset V1∪   ∪Vn, such that no player or coalition of players
Γ can gain a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing, for each element a ∈ V1 ∪     ∪ Vn, an
honest player i (1 ≤ i ≤ n, i  ∈ Γ) such that a ∈ Vi.
In several protocols in this paper, we will impose an additional privacy condition on the Shuf-
ﬂe problem; the multisets V1,...,Vn are composed of ciphertexts, which must be re-randomized
so that no player may determine which ciphertexts were part of his private input multiset. The
revised problem statement is as follows: all players learn the joint multiset V1 ∪     ∪ Vn, such
that no player or coalition of players can gain a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing, for
each element a ∈ V1 ∪     ∪ Vn, an honest player i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) such that a ∈ Vi.
Both variants of the Shuﬄe protocol can be easily accomplished with standard techniques [6,
19, 10, 15, 26], with communication complexity at most O(n2k).
4 Techniques and Mathematical Intuition
In this section, we introduce our techniques for privacy-preserving computation of operations
on sets and multisets.
Problem Setting. Let there be n players. We denote the private input set of player i as Si,
and |Si| = k (1 ≤ i ≤ n). We denote the jth element of set i as (Si)j. We denote the domain
of the elements in these sets as P, (∀i∈[n],j∈[k] (Si)j ∈ P).
Let R denote the plaintext domain Dom(Epk( )) (in Paillier’s cryptosystem, R is ZN). We
require that R be suﬃciently large that an element a drawn uniformly from R has only negligible
probability of representing an element of P, denoted a ∈ P. For example, we could require that
only elements of the form b = a || h(a) could represent an element in P. That is, there exists
an a of proper length such that b = a || h(a). If |h( )| = lg
 
1
ǫ
 
, then there is only ǫ probability
that a′ ← R represents an element in P.
In this section, we ﬁrst give background on polynomial representation of multisets, as well as
the mathematical properties of polynomials that we use in this chapter. We then introduce our
privacy-preserving(in a TTP setting) multiset operations using polynomial representations, then
show how to achieve privacy in the real setting by computing them using encrypted polynomials.
Finally, we overview the applications of these techniques explored in the rest of the chapter.
54.1 Background: Polynomial Rings and Polynomial Representation of
Sets
The polynomial ring R[x] consists of all polynomials with coeﬃcients from R. Let f,g ∈ R[x],
such that f(x) =
 deg(f)
i=0 f[i]xi, where f[i] denotes the coeﬃcient of xi in the polynomial f. Let
f +g denote the addition of f and g, f ∗g denote the multiplication of f and g, and f(d) denote
the dth formal derivative of f. Note that the formal derivative of f is
 deg(f)−1
i=0 (i+1)f[i+1]xi.
Polynomial Representation of Sets. In this chapter, we use polynomials to represent
multisets. Given a multiset S = {Sj}1≤j≤k, we construct a polynomial representation of S,
f ∈ R[x], as f(x) =
 
1≤j≤k(x − Sj). On the other hand, given a polynomial f ∈ R[x],
we deﬁne the multiset S represented by the polynomial f as follows: an element a ∈ S if
and only if (1) f(a) = 0 and (2) a represents an element from P. Note that our polynomial
representation naturally handles multisets: The element a appears in the multiset b times if
(x − a)b | f ∧ (x − a)b+1   | f.
Note that previous work utilized polynomials to represent sets [14] (as opposed to multisets).
However, to the best of our knowledge, no operations beyond polynomial evaluation have been
employed to manipulate said polynomials. As a result, previous work is limited to set intersection
and cannot be composed with other set operators. In this chapter, we propose a framework to
perform various set and multiset operations using polynomial representations and construct
eﬃcient privacy-preserving set operations using the mathematical properties of polynomials.
By utilizing polynomial representations to represent sets and multisets, our framework allows
arbitrary composition of multiset operators as outlined in our grammar.
4.2 Our Techniques: Privacy-Preserving Multiset Operations
In this section, we construct algorithms for computing the polynomial representation of opera-
tions on sets, including union, intersection, and element reduction. We design these algorithms
to be privacy-preserving in the following sense: the polynomial representation of any operation
result reveals no more information than the set representation of the result. First, we introduce
our algorithms for computing the polynomial representation of set operations union, intersec-
tion, and element reduction (with a trusted third party). We then extend these techniques
to encrypted polynomials, allowing secure implementation of our techniques without a trusted
third party. Note that the privacy-preserving multiset operations deﬁned in this section may be
arbitrarily composed (see Section 8.1), and constitute truly general techniques.
4.2.1 Set Operations Using Polynomial Representations
In this section, we introduce eﬃcient techniques for multiset operations using polynomial rep-
resentations. In particular, let f,g be polynomial representations of the multisets S and T,
respectively. We describe techniques to compute the polynomial representation of their union,
intersection, and element reduction. We design our techniques so that the polynomial represen-
tation of any operation result reveals no more information than the multiset representation of
the result. We formally state a strong privacy property for each operation in Theorems 1, 3,
and 5.
Union. We deﬁne the union of multisets S ∪ T as the multiset where each element a that
appears in S bS ≥ 0 times and T bT ≥ 0 times appears in the resulting multiset bS + bT times.
We compute the polynomial representation of S∪T as follows, where f and g are the polynomial
representation of S and T respectively:
f ∗ g.
6Note that f ∗ g is a polynomial representation of S ∪ T because (1) all elements that appear in
either set S or T are preserved: (f(a) = 0) ∧ (g(b) = 0) → ((f ∗ g)(a) = 0) ∧ ((f ∗ g)(b) = 0);
(2) as f(a) = 0 ⇔ (x − a) | f, duplicate elements from each multiset are preserved: (f(a) =
0) ∧ (g(a) = 0) → (x − a)2 | (f ∗ g). In addition, we prove that, given f ∗ g, one cannot learn
more information about S and T than what can be deduced from S ∪ T, as formally stated in
the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Let TTP1 be a trusted third party which receives the private input multiset Si
from player i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and then returns to every player the union multiset S1 ∪     ∪ Sn
directly. Let TTP2 be another trusted third party, which receives the private input multiset Si
from player i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and then: (1) calculates the polynomial representation fi for each
Si; (2) computes and returns to every player
 n
i=1 fi.
There exists a PPT translation algorithm such that, to each player, the results of the following
two scenarios are distributed identically: (1) applying translation to the output of TTP1; (2)
returning the output of TTP2 directly.
Proof. Theorem 1 is trivially true. (This theorem is included for completeness.)
Intersection. We deﬁne the intersection of multisets S ∩ T as the multiset where each
element a that appears in S bS > 0 times and T bT > 0 times appears in the resulting multiset
min{bS,bT} times. Let S and T be two multisets of equal size, and f and g be their polynomial
representations (also of equal size) respectively. We compute the polynomial representation of
S ∩ T as:
f ∗ r + g ∗ s
where r,s ← Rdeg(f)[x], where Rb[x] is the set of all polynomials of degree 0,...,b with coeﬃ-
cients chosen independently and uniformly from R: r =
 deg(f)
i=0 r[i]xi and s =
 deg(f)
i=0 s[i]xi,
where ∀0≤i≤deg(f) r[i] ← R, ∀0≤i≤deg(f) s[i] ← R.
We show below that f ∗ r + g ∗ s is a polynomial representation of S ∩ T. In addition, we
prove that, given f ∗r+g∗s, one cannot learn more information about S and T than what can
be deduced from S ∩ T, as formally stated in Theorem 3.
First, we must prove the following lemma, based on our deﬁnition of gcd as the output of
Euclid’s gcd algorithm (see Lemma 19 in Section B):
Lemma 2. Let f,g be polynomials in R[x] where R is a ring such that no PPT adversary
can ﬁnd the size of its subﬁelds with non-negligible probability, deg(f) = deg(g) = α, β ≥ α,
gcd(f,g) = 1, and f[deg(f)] ∈ R∗ ∧ g[deg(g)] ∈ R∗. Let r =
 β
i=0 r[i]xi and s =
 β
i=0 s[i]xi,
where ∀0≤i≤β r[i] ← R, ∀0≤i≤β s[i] ← R (independently).
Let u = f ∗ r + g ∗ s =
 α+β
i=0 u[i]xi. Then ∀0≤i≤α+β u[i] are distributed uniformly and
independently over R.
We prove Lemma 2 in Appendix B.
By this lemma, f ∗ r + g ∗ s = gcd(f,g) ∗ u, where u is distributed uniformly in Rγ[x] for
γ = 2deg(f) − |S ∩ T|. Note that a is a root of gcd(f,g) and (x − a)ℓa | gcd(f,g) if and only
if a appears ℓa times in S ∩ T. Moreover, because u is distributed uniformly in Rγ[x], with
overwhelming probability the roots of u do not represent any element from P (as explained
in the beginning of Section 4). Thus, the computed polynomial f ∗ r + g ∗ s is a polynomial
representation of S∩T. Note that this technique for computing the intersection of two multisets
can be extended to simultaneously compute the intersection of an arbitrary number of multisets
in a similar manner. Also, given f ∗ r + g ∗ s, one cannot learn more information about S and
T than what can be deduced from S ∩ T, as formally stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Let TTP1 be a trusted third party which receives the private input multiset Si of
size k from player i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and then returns to every player the intersection multiset
7S1 ∩   ∩Sn directly. Let TTP2 be another trusted third party, which receives the private input
multiset Si from player i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and then: (1) calculates the polynomial representation
fi for each Si; (2) chooses ri ← Rk[x]; (3) computes and returns to each player
 n
i=1 fi ∗ ri.
There exists a PPT translation algorithm such that, to each player, the results of the following
two scenarios are distributed identically: (1) applying translation to the output of TTP1; (2)
returning the output of TTP2 directly.
Proof sketch. Let the output of TTP1 be denoted T. The translation algorithm operates as
follows: (1) calculates the polynomial representation g of T; (2) chooses the random polynomial
u ← R2k−|T|[x]; (3) computes and returns g ∗ u.
Element Reduction. We deﬁne the operation of element reduction (by d) of a multiset S
(denoted Rdd(S)) as follows: for each element a that appears b times in S, it appears max{b −
d,0} times in the resulting multiset. We compute the polynomial representation of Rdd(S) as:
d  
j=0
f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj
where rj ← Rdeg(f)[x] (0 ≤ j ≤ d) and each Fj is any polynomial of degree j, such that
∀a∈P F(a)  = 0 (0 ≤ j ≤ d) and gcd(F0,...,Fd) = 1. Note that random polynomials of degree
0,...,d in R[x] have these properties with overwhelming probability.
To show that formal derivative operation allows element reduction, we require the following
lemma:
Lemma 4. Let Fj ∈ R[x] (0 ≤ j ≤ d) each of degree j such that gcd(F0,...,Fd) = 1. For
all elements a ∈ R such that ∀0≤j≤d (x − a) ∤ Fj, q ∈ R[X] such that (x − a) ∤ q, and
rj ← Rm+deg(q)[x] (0 ≤ j ≤ d), and:
• if m > d, f = (x − a)m ∗ q → (x − a)m−d |
 d
j=0 f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj ∧ (x − a)m−d+1 ∤
 d
j=0 f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj
• if m ≤ d, f = (x − a)m ∗ q → (x − a) ∤
 d
j=0 f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj
with overwhelming probability.
We prove this lemma in Appendix B. By Lemma 2,
 d
j=0 f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj =
gcd(f(d),f(d−1),...,f) ∗ u, where u is distributed uniformly in Rγ[x] for γ = 2k − |Rdd(S)|.
Thus, with overwhelming probability, any root of u does not represent any element from P.
Therefore,
 d
j=0 f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj is a polynomial representation of Rdd(S), and moreover, given
 d
j=0 f(j) ∗Fj ∗rj, one cannot learn more information about S than what can be deduced from
Rdd(S), as formally stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 5. Let Fj (0 ≤ j ≤ d) be publicly known polynomials of degree j such that
∀a∈P Fj(a)  = 0 and gcd(F0,...,Fd) = 1. Let TTP1 be a trusted third party which receives
a private input multiset S of size k, and then returns the reduction multiset Rdd(S) directly. Let
TTP2 be another trusted third party, which receives a private input multiset S, and then: (1)
calculates the polynomial representation f of S; (2) chooses r0,...,rd ← Rk[x]; (3) computes
and returns
 d
j=0 f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj.
There exists a PPT translation algorithm such that the results of the following two scenarios
are distributed identically: (1) applying translation to the output of TTP1; (2) returning the
output of TTP2 directly.
Proof sketch. Let the output of TTP1 be denoted T. The translation algorithm operates as
follows: (1) calculates the polynomial representation g of T; (2) chooses the random polynomial
u ← R2k−|T|[x]; (3) computes and returns g ∗ u.
84.2.2 Operations with Encrypted Polynomials
In the previous section, we prove the security of our polynomial-based multiset operators when
the polynomial representation of the result is computed by a trusted third party (TTP2). By
using additively homomorphic encryption, we allow these results to be implemented as proto-
cols in the real world without a trusted third party (i.e., the polynomial representation of the
set operations is computed by the parties collectively without a trusted third party). In the
algorithms given above, there are three basic polynomial operations that are used: addition,
multiplication, and the formal derivative. We give algorithms in this section for computation of
these operations with encrypted polynomials.
For f ∈ R[x], we represent the encryption of polynomial f, Epk(f), as the ordered
list of the encryptions of its coeﬃcients under the additively homomorphic cryptosystem:
Epk(f[0]),...,Epk(f[deg(f)]). Let f1, f2, and g be polynomials in R[x] such that f1(x) =
 deg(f1)
i=0 f1[i]xi, f2(x) =
 deg(f2)
i=0 f2[i]xi, and g(x) =
 deg(g)
i=0 g[i]xi. Let a,b ∈ R. Using the
homomorphic properties of the homomorphic cryptosystem, we can eﬃciently perform the fol-
lowing operations on encrypted polynomials without knowledge of the private key:
• Sum of encrypted polynomials: given the encryptions of the polynomial f1 and f2, we
can eﬃciently compute the encryption of the polynomial g := f1 + f2, by calculating
Epk(g[i]) := Epk(f1[i]) +h Epk(f2[i]) (0 ≤ i ≤ max{deg(f1),deg(f2)})
• Product of an unencrypted polynomial and an encrypted polynomial: given a polynomial
f2 and the encryption of polynomial f1, we can eﬃciently compute the encryption of
polynomial g := f1 ∗ f2, (also denoted f2 ∗h Epk(f1)) by calculating the encryption of
each coeﬃcient
Epk(g[i]) := (f2[0] ×h Epk(f1[i])) +h (f2[1] ×h Epk(f1[i −
1])) +h ... +h (f2[i] ×h Epk(f1[0])) (0 ≤ i ≤ deg(f1) + deg(f2)).
• Derivative of an encrypted polynomial: given the encryption of polynomial f1, we can
eﬃciently compute the encryption of polynomial g := d
dxf1, by calculating the encryption
of each coeﬃcient Epk(g[i]) := (i + 1) ×h Epk(f1[i + 1]) (0 ≤ i ≤ deg(f1) − 1).
• Evaluation of an encrypted polynomial at an unencrypted point: given the encryption of
polynomial f1, we can eﬃciently compute the encryption of a := f1(b), by calculating
Epk(a) := (b0 ×h Epk(f1[0])) +h (b1 ×h Epk(f1[1])) +h ... +h (bdeg(f1) ×h Epk(f1[deg(f1)])).
Utilizing the above operations on encrypted polynomials, we can securely compute results
according to the multiset operations described in Section 4.2.1 without the trusted third party
(TTP2). We demonstrate this property with concrete examples detailed in the remainder of
this chapter.
4.3 Overview of Applications
The techniques we introduce for privacy-preserving computations of multiset operations have
many applications. We give several concrete examples that utilize our techniques for speciﬁc
privacy-preserving functions on multisets in the following sections.
First, we design eﬃcient protocols for the Set-Intersection and Cardinality Set-Intersection
problems, secure against honest-but-curious adversaries (Section 5). We then provide an eﬃcient
protocol for the Over-Threshold Set-Union problem, as well as three variants of the Threshold
Set-Union problem, secure against honest-but-curious adversaries, in Section 6. We introduce
tools and protocols, secure against malicious players, for the Set-Intersection, Cardinality Set-
Intersection, and Over-Threshold Set-Union problems in Section 7. We propose an eﬃcient
protocol for the Subset problem in Section 8.2.
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Input: There are n ≥ 2 honest-but-curious players, c < n dishonestly colluding, each with
a private input set Si, such that |Si| = k. The players share the secret key sk, to which pk
is the corresponding public key to a homomorpic cryptosystem.
1. Each player i = 1,...,n
(a) calculates the polynomial fi = (x − (Si)1)...(x − (Si)k)
(b) sends the encryption of the polynomial fi to players i + 1,...,i + c
(c) chooses c + 1 polynomials ri,0,...,ri,c ← Rk[x]
(d) calculates the encryption of the polynomial φi = fi−c∗ri,i−c+   +fi−1∗ri,i−1+
fi ∗ ri,0, utilizing the algorithms given in Sec. 4.2.2.
2. Player 1 sends the encryption of the polynomial λ1 = φ1, to player 2
3. Each player i = 2,...,n in turn
(a) receives the encryption of the polynomial λi−1 from player i − 1
(b) calculates the encryption of the polynomial λi = λi−1 + φi by utilizing the
algorithms given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(c) sends the encryption of the polynomial λi to player i + 1 mod n
4. Player 1 distributes the encryption of the polynomial p = λn =
 n
i=1 fi ∗   c
j=0 ri+j,j
 
to all other players.
5. All players perform a group decryption to obtain the polynomial p.
Each player i = 1,...,n determines the intersection multiset as follows: for each a ∈ Si, he
calculates b such that (x − a)b|p ∧ (x − a)b+1   |p. The element a appears b times in the
intersection multiset.
Figure 1: Set-Intersection protocol for the honest-but-curious case.
More generally, our techniques allow private computation of functions based on composition
of the union, intersection, and element reduction operators. We discuss techniques for this
general private computation on multisets in Section 8.1.
Our techniques are widely applicable, even outside the realm of computation of functions
over multisets. As an example, we show how to apply our techniques to private evaluation of
boolean formulae in CNF form in Section 8.3.
5 Application I: Private Set-Intersection and Cardinality
Set-Intersection
In this section, we design protocols for Set-Intersection and Cardinality Set-Intersection, secure
against a coalition of honest-but-curious adversaries.
5.1 Set-Intersection
Problem Deﬁnition. Let there be n parties; each has a private input set Si (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
of size k. We deﬁne the Set-Intersection problem as follows: all players learn the intersection
of all private input multisets without gaining any other information; that is, each player learns
S1 ∩ S2 ∩     ∩ Sn.
Our protocol for the honest-but-curious case is given in Fig. 1. In this protocol, each player
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) ﬁrst calculates a polynomial representation fi ∈ R[x] of his input multiset
10Si. He then encrypts this polynomial fi, and sends it to c other players i + 1,...,i + c. For
each encrypted polynomial Epk(fi), each player i + j (0 ≤ j ≤ c) chooses a random poly-
nomial ri+j,j ∈ Rk[x]. Note that at most c players may collude, thus
 c
j=0 ri+j,j is both
uniformly distributed and known to no player. They then compute the encrypted polynomial   c
j=0 ri+j,j
 
∗h Epk(fi). From these encrypted polynomials, the players compute the encryp-
tion of p =
 n
i=1 fi∗
  c
j=0 ri+j,j
 
. All players engage in group decryption to obtain the polyno-
mial p. Thus, by Theorem 3, the players have privately computed p, a polynomial representing
the intersection of their private input multisets. Finally, to reconstruct the multiset represented
by polynomial p, the player i, for each a ∈ Si, calculates b such that (x−a)b|p ∧ (x−a)b+1   |p.
The element a appears b times in the intersection multiset.
Security Analysis. We show that our protocol is correct, as each player learns the appro-
priate answer set at its termination, and secure in the honest-but-curious model, as no player
gains information that it would not gain when using its input in the ideal model. A formal
statement of these properties is as follows:
Theorem 6. In the Set-Intersection protocol of Fig. 1, every player learns the intersection of
all players’ private inputs, S1 ∩ S2 ∩     ∩ Sn, with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 7. Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is se-
mantically secure, with overwhelming probability, in the Set-Intersection protocol of Fig. 1, any
coalition of fewer than n PPT honest-but-curious players learns no more information than would
be gained by using the same private inputs in the ideal model with a trusted third party.
We provide proof sketches for Theorems 6 and 7 in Appendix C.1.
5.2 Cardinality Set-Intersection
Problem Deﬁnition. We deﬁne the Cardinality Set-Intersection problem on sets as follows:
each player learns the number of unique elements in S1 ∩     ∩ Sn, without learning any other
information. A variant of this problem is the Cardinality Set-Intersection problem on multisets,
which we deﬁne as follows: all players learn |S1 ∩     ∩ Sn|, as computed on multisets.
Our protocol for Cardinality Set-Intersection, given in Figure 2, proceeds as our protocol
for Set-Intersection, until the point where all players learn the encryption of p, the polynomial
representation of S1∩   ∩Sn. Each player i = 1,...,n then evaluates this encrypted polynomial
at each unique element a ∈ Si, obtaining βa, an encryption of p(a). He then blinds each
encrypted evaluation p(a) by calculating β′
a = ba ×h βa. All players then distribute and shuﬄe
the ciphertexts β′
a constructed by each player, such that all players receive all ciphertexts,
without learning their source. The Shuﬄe protocol can be easily accomplished with standard
techniques [6, 19, 10, 15, 26], with communication complexity at most O(n2k). The players
then decrypt these ciphertexts, ﬁnding that nb of the decryptions are 0, implying that there
are b unique elements in S1 ∩     ∩ Sn. FNP utilize a variation of this technique [14], but it
is not obvious how to construct a multiparty Cardinality Set-Intersection protocol from their
techniques.
Variants. Our protocol can be simply extended to privately compute the Cardinality Set-
Intersection problem on multisets, by utilizing an encoding as follows: any element a that
appears b times in a multiset is encoded as the set: {a || 1,...,a || b}, with element included
only once. Note that this is a set of equivalent size as the original multiset representation, so
this variant preserves the eﬃciency of our protocol.
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Input: There are n ≥ 2 honest-but-curious players, c < n dishonestly colluding, each with
a private input set Si, such that |Si| = k. The players share the secret key sk, to which pk
is the corresponding public key to a homomorpic cryptosystem.
1. Each player i = 1,...,n
(a) calculates the polynomial fi = (x − (Si)1)...(x − (Si)k)
(b) sends the encryption of the polynomial fi to players i + 1,...,i + c
(c) chooses c + 1 random polynomials ri,0,...,ri,c ← Rk[x]
(d) calculates the encryption of the polynomial φi = fi−c∗ri,i−c+   +fi−1∗ri,i−1+
fi ∗ ri,0, utilizing the algorithms given in Sec. 4.2.2.
2. Player 1 sends the encrypted polynomial λ1 = φ1, to player 2
3. Each player i = 2,...,n in turn
(a) receives the encryption of the polynomial λi−1 from player i − 1
(b) calculates the encryption of the polynomial λi = λi−1 + φi by utilizing the
algorithms given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(c) sends the encryption of the polynomial λi to player i + 1 mod n
4. Player 1 distributes the encryption of the polynomial p = λn =
 n
i=1 fi ∗   c
j=0 ri+j,j
 
to all other players.
5. Each player i = 1,...,n
(a) evaluates the encryption of the polynomial p at each input (Si)j, obtaining
encrypted elements Epk(cij) where cij = p((Si)j), using the algorithm given in
Sec. 4.2.2.
(b) for each j = 1,...,k chooses a random number rij ← R and calculates an
encrypted element (Vi)j = rij ×h Epk(cij)
6. All players perform the Shuﬄe protocol on their private input sets Vi, obtaining a
joint set V , in which all ciphertexts have been re-randomized.
7. All players 1,...n decrypt each element of the shuﬄed set V
If nb of the decrypted elements from V are 0, then the size of the set intersection is b.
Figure 2: Cardinality set-intersection protocol for the honest-but-curious case.
Security Analysis. We show that our protocol is correct, as each player learns the size of
the answer set at its termination, and secure in the honest-but-curious model, as no player gains
information that it would not gain when using its input in the ideal model. A formal statement
of these properties is as follows:
Theorem 8. In the Cardinality Set-Intersection protocol of Fig. 2, every player learns the size
of the intersection of all players’ private inputs, |S1∩S2∩   ∩Sn|, with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 9. Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is se-
mantically secure and that the Shuﬄe protocol is secure, with overwhelming probability, in the
Cardinality Set-Intersection protocol of Fig. 2, any coalition of fewer than n PPT honest-but-
curious players learns no more information than would be gained by using the same private
inputs in the ideal model with a trusted third party.
We provide proof sketches for Theorems 8 and 9 in Appendix C.2.
125.3 Malicious Case
We can extend our protocols in Figures 1 and 2, secure against honest-but-curious players, to
protocols secure against malicious adversaries by adding zero-knowledge proofs or using cut-and-
choose to ensure security. We give details of our protocols secure against malicious adversaries
in Section 7.2. We prove security against malicious parties for these protocols in Appendices C.1
and C.2.
6 Application II: Private Over-Threshold Set-Union and
Threshold Set-Union
In this section, we design protocols for the Over-Threshold Set-Union problem and several
variations of the Threshold Set-Union problem, secure against a coalition of honest-but-curious
adversaries.
6.1 Over-Threshold Set-Union Protocol
Problem Deﬁnition. Let there be n players; each has a private input set Si (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
of size k. We deﬁne the Over-Threshold Set-Union problem as follows: all players learn which
elements appear in the union of the players’ private input multisets at least a threshold number
t times, and the number of times these elements appeared in the union of players’ private inputs,
without gaining any other information. For example, assume that a appears in the combined
private input of the players 15 times. If t = 10, then all players learn a has appeared 15 times.
However, if t = 16, then no player learns a appears in any player’s private input. This problem
can be represented as Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn).
We describe our protocol secure against honest-but-curious players for the Over-Threshold
Set-Union problem in Fig. 3. In this protocol, each player i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) ﬁrst calculates fi, the
polynomial representation of its input multiset Si. All players then compute the encryption of
polynomial p =
 n
i=1 fi, the polynomial representation of S1 ∪     ∪ Sn. Players i = 1,...,c +
1 then each choose random polynomials ri,0,...,ri,t−1, and calculate the encryption of the
polynomial
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗ ri,ℓ as shown in Fig. 3. All players then calculate the encryption
of the polynomial Φ =
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗
  c+1
i=0 ri,ℓ
 
and perform a group decryption to obtain
Φ. As at most c players may dishonestly collude, the polynomials
 c+1
i=1 ri,ℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ d) are
uniformly distributed and known to no player. By Theorem 5, Φ is a polynomial representation
of Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn).
Each player i = 1,...,n then chooses bi,j ← R and computes ui,j = bi,j × Φ((Si)j) + (Si)j
(1 ≤ j ≤ k). Each element ui,j equals (Si)j if (Si)j ∈ Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), and is otherwise
uniformly distributed over R. The players then shuﬄe these elements ui,j, such that each player
learns all of the elements, but does not learn which player’s set they came from. The shuﬄe
can be easily accomplished with standard techniques [6, 19, 10, 15, 26], with communication
complexity at most O(n2k). The multiset formed by those shuﬄed elements that represent
elements of P is Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn).
Security Analysis. We show that our protocol is correct, as each player learns the appro-
priate answer set at its termination, and secure in the honest-but-curious model, as no player
gains information that it would not gain when using its input in the ideal model with a trusted
third party. A formal statement of these properties is as follows:
Theorem 10. In the Over-Threshold Set-Union protocol of Fig. 3, every honest-but-curious
player learns each element a which appears at least t times in the union of the n players’ private
inputs, as well as the number of times it so appears, with overwhelming probability.
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Input: There are n ≥ 2 honest-but-curious players, c < n dishonestly colluding, each with
a private input set Si, such that |Si| = k. The players share the secret key sk, to which pk
is the corresponding public key for a homomorphic cryptosystem. The threshold number of
repetitions at which an element appears in the output is t. F0,...,Ft−1 are ﬁxed polynomials
of degree 0,...,t − 1 which have no common factors or roots representing elements of P.
1. Each player i = 1,...,n calculates the polynomial fi = (x − (Si)1)...(x − (Si)k)
2. Player 1 sends the encryption of the polynomial λ1 = f1 to player 2
3. Each player i = 2,...,n
(a) receives the encryption of the polynomial λi−1 from player i − 1
(b) calculates the encryption of the polynomial λi = λi−1 ∗ fi by utilizing the algo-
rithm given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(c) sends the encryption of the polynomial λi to player i + 1 mod n
4. Player 1 distributes the encryption of the polynomial p = λn =
 n
i=1 fi to players
2,...,c + 1
5. Each player i = 1,...,c + 1
(a) calculates the encryption of the 1,..,t − 1th derivatives of p, denoted
p(1),...,p(t−1), by repeating the algorithm given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(b) chooses random polynomials ri,0,...,ri,t−1 ← Rnk[x]
(c) calculates the encryption of the polynomial
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗ ri,ℓ and sends it to
all other players.
6. All players perform a group decryption to obtain the polynomial Φ =
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ)∗Fj ∗   c+1
i=0 ri,ℓ
 
.
7. Each player i = 1,...,n, for each j = 1,...,k
(a) chooses a random element bi,j ← R
(b) calculates ui,j = bi,j × Φ((Si)j) + (Si)j
8. All players i = 1,...n perform the Shuﬄe protocol on the elements ui,j (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
such that each player obtains a joint set V .
Each element a ∈ P that appears b times in V is an element in the threshold set that
appears b times in the players’ private inputs.
Figure 3: Over-Threshold Set-Union protocol secure against honest-but-curious adversaries.
Theorem 11. Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is
semantically secure, with overwhelming probability, in the Over-Threshold Set-Union protocol of
Fig. 3, any coalition of fewer than n PPT honest-but-curious players learns no more information
than would be gained by using the same private inputs in the ideal model with a trusted third
party.
We provide proof sketches for Theorems 10 and 11 in Appendix D.1.
6.2 Threshold Set-Union
Problem Deﬁnition. We deﬁne the Threshold Set-Union problem as follows: all players
learn which elements appear in the combined private input of the players at least a threshold
number t times. For example, assume that a appears in the combined private input of the
14players 15 times. If t = 10, then all players learn a. However, if t = 16, then no player learns a.
This problem diﬀers from the Over-Threshold Set-Union problem in that each player learns the
elements of Rdt−1(S1 ∩     ∩ Sn), without learning how often each element appears.
We oﬀer protocols for several variants on Threshold Set-Union: threshold contribution, per-
fect, and semi-perfect. Threshold contribution allows for thresholds t ≥ 1, and each player
learns only those elements which appear both in his private input and the threshold set: player
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) learns the elements of Si ∩Rdt−1(S1 ∩   ∩Sn). Perfect threshold set-intersection
allows for thresholds t ≥ 1, and conforms exactly to the deﬁnition of threshold set-intersection.
The semi-perfect variant requires for security that t ≥ 2, and that the cheating coalition does
not include any single element more than t − 1 times in their private inputs. Note that the
information illicitly gained by the coalition when they include more than t − 1 copies of an
element a is restricted to a possibility of learning that there exists some other player whose
private input contains a. We do not consider the diﬀerence in security between the semi-perfect
and perfect variants to be signiﬁcant.
The protocols for the Threshold Set-Union problem, given in Figs. 4, 5, and 6, are identical
to the protocol for Over-Threshold Set-Union (given in Fig. 3) from step 1-5. We explain the
diﬀerences between the protocols for each variant: threshold contribution, semi-perfect, and
perfect. Each player constructs encryptions of the elements Φ((Si)j) from his private input set
in step 6, and continues as described below.
Threshold Contribution Threshold Set-Union. This protocol is given in Fig. 5. The
players cooperatively decrypt the encrypted elements Φ((Si)j) ∗ (
 n
ℓ=1 bℓ,i,j). This decryption
must take place in such a way that only player i learns the element Φ((Si)j) ∗ (
 n
ℓ=1 bℓ,i,j).
Typically, parties produce decryption shares and reconstruct the element from them; player i
simply retains his decryption share, so that only he learns the decryption. Thus each player
learns which of his elements appear in the threshold set, since if (Si)j appears in the threshold
set, Φ((Si)j) ∗ (
 n
ℓ=1 bℓ,i,j) = 0. No player learns more information because if an element (Si)j
is not in the threshold set, Φ((Si)j) ∗ (
 n
ℓ=1 bℓ,i,j) is uniformly distributed.
Semi-Perfect Threshold Set-Union. This protocol is given in Fig. 4. The encrypted
element (Ui)j calculated from the encrypted evaluation of Φ((Si)j) is either: (1) an encryption
of the private input element (Si)j (if (Si)j is in the intersection set) or (2) an encryption of
a random element (otherwise). However, the player also constructs a corresponding encrypted
tag for each (Ui)j, Tij. We require that the cryptosystem used to construct these tags be key-
private, so that the origin of ciphertext pairs T,U cannot be ascertained by the key used to
construct the tags.
The players then correctly obtain a decryption of each element in the threshold set exactly
once. Any other time a ciphertext U for an element in the threshold set is decrypted, a player
sabotages it. In group decryption schemes, players generally produce shares of the decrypted
element; if one player sends a uniformly generated share instead of a valid one, the decrypted
element is uniform. If the decrypted element is uniform, it conveys no information to the
players. To ensure an encryption of an element in the threshold set is not decrypted once
the element is known to be in the threshold set, a player sabotages the decryption under the
following conditions: (1) he can decrypt the tag to h(a) || a for some a and (2) a has already
been determined to be a member of the threshold set. All other ciphertexts should be correctly
decrypted; either they are encryptions of elements in the threshold set which have not yet been
decrypted, or they are encryptions of random elements.
Note that the protocol is the only protocol proposed in this chapter with a non-constant
number of rounds. Because of the need to sabotage decryptions based on the results of past
decryptions, there are O(nk) rounds in this protocol.
15Perfect Threshold Set-Union. This protocol is given in Fig. 6. Each player constructs
the encrypted elements (Ui)j from the encrypted evaluation of Φ((Si)j) as written in step 6
of Figure 4. The players then utilize the Shuﬄe protocol to anonymously distribute these
elements. If an element appears in the threshold set, then at least one encryption of it appears
in the shuﬄed ciphertexts. The players ensure in step 8 that all duplicates (ciphertexts of
the same element) except the ﬁrst have a random element added to them. This disguises the
number of players who have each element of the threshold set in their private input. Let the
shuﬄed ciphertexts U have an arbitrary ordering U′
1,...,U′
nk. IsEq(C,C′) = 1 if the ciphertexts
C encode the same plaintext, and 0 otherwise. (This calculation can be achieved with the
techniques in [22].) The players i ∈ [n] then choose random elements qi,ℓ ← R (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ nk) and
decrypt the ciphertexts Wℓ = U′
ℓ +h Epk
 
(
 n
i=1 qℓ)(IsEq(U′
ℓ,U′
ℓ−1) + ...IsEq(U′
ℓ,U′
1))
 
. Thus,
if U′
ℓ is a duplicate (encryption of an element which also appeared early in the ordering), it has
a uniformly distributed element added to it, and conveys no information. Each element of the
threshold set is decrypted exactly once, and all players thus learn the threshold set.
Security Analysis. We show that our protocol is correct, as each player learns the appro-
priate result set at its termination, and secure in the honest-but-curious model, as no player
gains information that it would not gain when using its input in the ideal model. A formal
statement of these properties is as follows:
Theorem 12. In the Threshold Contribution Threshold Set-Union protocol of Fig. 5, every
player i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) learns the set Si ∩ Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 13. In the Semi-Perfect Threshold Set-Union protocol of Fig. 4, each player i (1 ≤
i ≤ n) learns the set Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 14. In the Perfect Threshold Set-Union protocol of Fig. 6, every player learns the
set Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 15. Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is
semantically secure and that the Shuﬄe protocol is secure, with overwhelming probability, in the
Threshold Set-Union protocols of Figs. 4, 5, and 6, any coalition of fewer than n PPT honest-
but-curious players learns no more information than would be gained by using the same private
inputs in the ideal model with a trusted third party.
We provide proof sketches for Theorems 12, 13, 14, and 15 in Appendix D.2.
6.3 Malicious Case
By adding zero-knowledge proofs to our Over-Threshold Set-Union protocol secure against
honest-but-curious adversaries, we extend our results to enable security against malicious ad-
versaries. We provide details of our protocol secure against malicious adversaries in Section 7.4,
and proof of security in Appendix D.1.
7 Set-Intersection, Cardinality Set-Intersection, and
Over-Threshold Set-Union for Malicious Parties
We extend the protocols for the Set-Intersection, Cardinality Set-Intersection, and Over-
Threshold Set-Union problems given in Sections 5 and 6 to obtain security against adversaries
in the malicious model. To obtain this result, we add zero-knowledge proofs, veriﬁed by all
players, to ensure the correctness of all computation. In this section, we ﬁrst introduce notation
for zero-knowledge proofs, then give the protocols secure against malicious parties.
167.1 Tools
In this section, we describe cryptographic tools that we utilize in our protocols secure against
malicious players.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs. We utilize several zero-knowledge proofs in our protocols for the
malicious adversary model. We introduce the notation for these zero-knowledge proofs below;
for additively homomorphic cryptosystems such as Paillier, we can eﬃciently construct these
zero-knowledge proofs using standard constructions [7, 5].
• POPK{Epk(x)} denotes a zero-knowledge proof that given a public ciphertext Epk(x), the
player knows the corresponding plaintext x [8].
• ZKPK{f | p′ = f ∗h α} is shorthand notation for a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
that the prover knows a polynomial f such that encrypted polynomial p′ = f ∗h α, given
the encrypted polynomials p′ and α.
• ZKPK{f | (p′ = f ∗h α) ∧ (y = Epk (f))} is the proof ZKPK{f | p′ = f ∗h α} with the
additional constraint that y = Epk(f) (y is the encryption of f), given the encrypted
polynomial p′, y, and α.
Equivocal Commitment. A standard commitment scheme allows parties to give a “sealed
envelope” that can be later opened to reveal exactly one value. We use an equivocal commitment
scheme in our protocols secure against malicious players, such that the simulator can open the
‘envelope’ to an arbitrary value without being detected by the adversary [20, 24].
7.2 Set-Intersection Protocol for Malicious Adversaries
Our protocol for malicious parties performing Set-Intersection, given in Fig. 7, proceeds largely
as the protocol secure against honest-but-curious parties, which was given in Fig. 1. The com-
mitments to the data items Λ(ci,j) are purely for the purposes of a simulation proof. We add
zero-knowledge proofs to prevent three forms of misbehavior: choosing ciphertexts for the en-
crypted coeﬃcients of fi without knowledge of their plaintext, not performing the polynomial
multiplication of fj ∗ ri,j correctly, and not performing decryption correctly. We also constrain
the leading coeﬃcient of fi to be 1 for all players, to prevent any player from setting their
polynomial to 0; if fi = 0, every element is a root, and thus it can represent an unlimited
number of elements. We can thus detect or prevent misbehavior from malicious players, forcing
this protocol to operate like the honest-but-curious protocol in Fig. 1. The protocol can gain
eﬃciency by taking advantage of the maximum coalition size c.
Our set-intersection protocol secure against malicious parties utilizes an expensive (O(k2)
size) zero-knowledge proof to prevent malicious parties from cheating when multiplying the
polynomial ri,j by the encryption of the polynomial fj. Each player i must commit to each
polynomial ri,j (1 ≤ i,j ≤ n), for purposes of constructing a zero-knowledge proof. We may
easily replace this proof with use of the cut-and-choose technique, which requires only O(k)
communication.
Security Analysis. We provide a simulation proof of this protocol’s security; an interme-
diary G translates between the real wold with malicious, colluding PPT players Γ and the ideal
world, where a trusted third party computes the answer set. Our proof shows that no Γ can
distinguish between the ideal world and the real world, thus no information other than that in
the answer set can be gained by malicious players. A formal statement of our security property
is as follows:
17Theorem 16. Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is
semantically secure, and the speciﬁed zero-knowledge proofs and proofs of correct decryption
cannot be forged, then in the Set-Intersection protocol for the malicious case in Fig. 7, for any
coalition Γ of colluding players (at most n−1 such colluding parties), there is a player (or group
of players) G operating in the ideal model, such that the views of the players in the ideal model is
computationally indistinguishable from the views of the honest players and Γ in the real model.
Proof of this theorem is given in Appendix C.1.
7.3 Cardinality Set-Intersection Protocol for Malicious Adversaries
We give a protocol, secure against malicious parties, to perform Cardinality Set-Intersection
in Fig. 8. It proceeds largely as the protocol secure against honest-but-curious parties, which
was given in Fig. 2. The commitments to the data items Λ(ri,j) are purely for the purposes
of a simulation proof. We add zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge to prevent ﬁve forms of
misbehavior: choosing fi without knowledge of its roots, choosing fi such that it is not the
product of linear factors, not performing the polynomial multiplication of fj ∗ ri,j correctly,
not calculating encrypted elements (Vi)j correctly (either not from the data items (Si)j or not
evaluating the encrypted polynomial p), and not performing decryption correctly. We can thus
detect or prevent misbehavior from malicious players, forcing this protocol to operate like the
honest-but-curious protocol in Fig. 2.
Security Analysis. We provide a simulation proof of this protocol’s security; an interme-
diary G translates between the real wold with malicious, colluding PPT players Γ and the ideal
world, where a trusted third party computes the answer set. Our proof shows that no Γ can
distinguish between the ideal world and the real world, thus no information other than that in
the answer set can be gained by malicious players. A formal statement of our security property
is as follows:
Theorem 17. Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is
semantically secure, the Shuﬄe protocol is secure, and the speciﬁed zero-knowledge proofs and
proofs of correct decryption cannot be forged, then in the Cardinality Set-Intersection protocol
for the malicious case in Fig. 8, for any coalition Γ of colluding players (at most n − 1 such
colluding parties), there is a player (or group of players) G operating in the ideal model, such
that the views of the players in the ideal model is computationally indistinguishable from the
views of the honest players and Γ in the real model.
Proof of this theorem is given in Appendix C.2.
7.4 Over-Threshold Set-Union Protocol for Malicious Adversaries
We give a protocol, secure against malicious parties, to perform Over-Threshold Set-Union in
Fig. 9. It proceeds largely as the protocol secure against honest-but-curious parties, which
was given in Fig. 3. The commitments to the data items Λ(ri,j) are purely for the purposes
of a simulation proof. We add zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge to prevent six forms of
misbehavior: choosing fi without knowledge of its roots, choosing fi such that it is not the
product of linear factors, not performing the polynomial multiplication of fj ∗ λj−1 correctly,
not calculating αi,ℓ = p(ℓ) ∗ ri,ℓ (0 ≤ ℓ ≤ t − 1) correctly, not calculating encrypted elements
(Vi)j correctly (either not from the data items (Si)j or not evaluating the encrypted polynomial
Φ), and not performing decryption correctly. We can thus detect or prevent misbehavior from
malicious players, forcing this protocol to operate like the honest-but-curious protocol in Fig. 3.
18Security Analysis. We provide a simulation proof of this protocol’s security; an interme-
diary G translates between the real wold with malicious, colluding PPT players Γ and the ideal
world, where a trusted third party computes the answer set. Our proof shows that no Γ can
distinguish between the ideal world and the real world, thus no information other than that in
the answer set can be gained by malicious players. A formal statement of our security property
is as follows:
Theorem 18. Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is
semantically secure, the Shuﬄe protocol is secure, and the speciﬁed zero-knowledge proofs and
proofs of correct decryption cannot be forged, then in the Over-Threshold Set-Union protocol for
the malicious case in Fig. 8, for any coalition Γ of colluding players (at most n−1 such colluding
parties), there is a player (or group of players) G operating in the ideal model, such that the
views of the players in the ideal model is computationally indistinguishable from the views of the
honest players and Γ in the real model.
Proof of this theorem is given in Appendix D.1.
8 Other Applications
Our techniques for privacy-preservingcomputation of multiset operations have wide applicability
beyond the protocols discussed earlier in Sections 5 and 6. We ﬁrst discuss the composition of
our techniques to compute arbitrary functions based on the intersection, union, and reduction
operators. We also propose an eﬃcient method for the Subset problem, determining whether
A ⊆ B. As an example of the application of our techniques to problems outside the realm of
set computation, we describe their use in evaluation of boolean formulas.
8.1 General Set Computation
Our techniques for privacy-preserving set operations can be arbitrarily composed to enable a
wide range of privacy-preserving set computations. In particular, we give a grammar describing
functions on multisets that can be eﬃciently computed using our privacy-preserving operations:
Υ ::= s | Rdd(Υ) | Υ ∩ Υ | s ∪ Υ | Υ ∪ s,
where s represents any multiset held by some player, and d ≥ 1. Note that any monotone
function on multisets can be expressed using the grammar above, and thus our techniques for
privacy-preserving set operations are truly general.
It is worth noting that the above grammar only allows computation of the union oper-
ator when at least one of the two operands is a set known to some player. Although any
monotone function on sets can be described by our grammar, in some cases it is desirable
(or more eﬃcient) to enable the calculation of the union operator on two sets calculated from
other set operations, such that neither operand is known to any player. In this case, we could
calculate the union operation in the following way. Let λ and Epk(f) be the encrypted poly-
nomial representations of the two multisets. The players use standard techniques to privately
obtain additive shares f1,...,fν of f, given Epk(f). Using these shares, they then calculate
(f1 ∗h λ) +h ... +h (fν ∗h λ) = f ∗h λ, the encryption of the polynomial representation of the
union multiset.
8.2 Private Subset Relation
Problem Statement Let the set A be held by Alice. The set B may be the result of an
arbitrary function over multiple players’ input sets (for example as calculated using the grammar
19above). The Subset problem is to determine whether A ⊆ B without revealing any additional
information.
Let λ be the encryption of the polynomial p representing B. Note that A ⊆ B ⇔ ∀a∈A p(a) =
0. Alice thus evaluates the encrypted polynomial λ at each element a ∈ A, homomorphically
multiplies a random element by each encrypted evaluation, and adds these blinded ciphertexts
to obtain β′. If β′ is an encryption of 0, then A ⊆ B. More formally:
1. For each element a = Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ |A|), the player holding A:
(a) calculates βj = λ(a)
(b) chooses a random element bj ← R, and calculates β′
j = bj ×h βj
2. The player holding A calculates β′ = β′
1 +h ... +h β′
|A|
3. All players together decrypt β′ to obtain y. If y = 0, then A ⊆ B.
This protocol can be easily extended to allow the set A to be held by multiple players, such that
A = A1 ∪     ∪ Aν, where each set Ai is held by a single player.
8.3 Computation of CNF Formulas
Finally, we show that our techniques on private set operations have applications outside of the
realm of set computations. As a concrete example, we show that we can apply our techniques to
eﬃcient privacy-preserving evaluation of boolean formulas, in particular, the conjunctive normal
form (CNF). A formula in CNF is a conjunction of a number of disjunctive clauses, each of which
is formed of several variables (or their negations).
Problem Statement Let φ be a public CNF boolean formula on variables V1,...,Vκ. Each
player knows the truth assignment to some subset of {V1,...,Vκ}, where each variable is known
to at least one player. The players cooperatively calculate the truth value of φ under this
assignment, without revealing any other information about the variable assignment.
We address this problem by introducing set representations of boolean formulas. Let True,
False be distinct elements of R (e.g., 0 and 1). For each variable in the formula, let the set
representation of the variable be { True} if its value is true, and { False} if its value is false.
Then, replace each ∨ operator in φ with a ∪ operator, and each ∧ operator with a ∩ operator.
If True is a member of the resulting set, then φ is true. The polynomial set representation
of the CNF formula can now be evaluated by the players through use of our privacy-preserving
multiset operations, as the function is described in the grammar given in Section 8.1.
We can also solve many variations of boolean formula evaluation using our techniques. For
example, we might require, instead of using the boolean operations, that at least t of the
variables in a clause be satisﬁed. Note that using our techniques can be more eﬃcient than
standard multiparty techniques, as they require an expensive multiplication operation, involving
all players, to compute the ∧ operator [3, 17].
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22A Notation
• P – the set of elements which can be members of a private input set
• k – size of each private input set
• n – number of players participating in a protocol
• t – threshold number, an element must appear t times in the private input sets to be
included in the threshold set
• Epk( ) – encryption under the additively homomorphic, public key cryptosystem to which
all players share a secret key
• Epk(a) +h Epk(b) – combination of two ciphertexts (under the homomorphic cryptosystem)
to produce a re-randomized ciphertext which is the encryption of a + b
• a ×h Epk(b) – combination of an integer and a ciphertext (under the homomorphic cryp-
tosystem) to produce a re-randomized ciphertext which is the encryption of ab
• f ∗h Epk(g) – combination of two polynomials (under the homomorphic cryptosystem) to
produce a re-randomized encrypted polynomial which is the encryption of f ∗ g
• F0,...,Fd – public ‘helper’ polynomials for computing element reduction
• h( ) – a cryptographic hash function from {0,1}∗ to {0,1}ℓ (ℓ = lg
 1
ǫ
 
), where ǫ is negli-
gible.
• Rdd(S) denotes the element reduction by d of set S
• Ra[x] denotes the set of all polynomials of degree between 0 and a with coeﬃcients from
R
• [c] for an integer c denotes the set {1,...,c}
• a := b denotes that the variable a is given the value b
• a || b denotes a concatenated with b
• a ← S denotes that element a is sampled uniformly from set S
• f ∗ g is the product of the polynomials f,g
• deg(p) is degree of polynomial p
• p(d) is the dth formal derivative of p
• gcd(p,q) is the greatest common divisor of p, q
• Si is the ith player’s private input set
• Vj is the jth element of the set V , under some arbitrary ordering
B Proof of Mathematical Lemmas
In this section, we prove Lemmas 2 and 4, as well as several lemmas on which these proofs
depend.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 19. Let the ring R have subﬁelds F1 and F2. Deﬁne the gcd of two polynomials
f,g ∈ R[x] as the output of Euclid’s algorithm for computing the greatest common denominator;
if Euclid’s algorithm fails, the gcd is undeﬁned.
Any PPT adversary who can obtain (with non-negligible probability) two polynomials for which
the gcd is undeﬁned can determine the size of the subﬁelds of R (with non-negligible probability).
Proof. If the leading coeﬃcient of a polynomial p is in R∗, then for any polynomial b ∈ R[x],
there exist unique polynomials q,r such that p = q∗b+r (deg(r) < deg(b)) [28]. Note that this is
the sole calculation necessary to compute the Euclidean gcd algorithm, and that this algorithm
runs in PPT. Thus, if this algorithm fails to compute gcd(f,g), it must have calculated some
polynomial p′ as an intermediate result such that the leading coeﬃcient of p′ is in R\(R∗∪{0}).
The elements of R \ (R∗ ∪ {0}) are those without a multiplicitive inverse: multiples of |Fℓ|
23(1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 2). Thus, the polynomial p that causes Euclid’s algorithm to fail must have a leading
coeﬃcient of a multiple of the size of some sub-ﬁeld Fℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 2). Given this coeﬃcient, one
can compute |F1|,|F2| in probabilistic polynomial time by using the Euclidean algorithm over
integers. As, by assumption in Section 3.2, this problem is hard over our ring R, we can (with
overwhelming probability) compute gcd(f,g) using Euclid’s algorithm.
Remark 20. For all a,b ∈ R, if a ∈ R∗, there exists no element c ∈ R (c  = b) such that
ab = ac.
Lemma 21. For all polynomials f,g ∈ R[x] such that the leading coeﬃcient of f is a member
of R∗, there exists no polynomial y ∈ R[x] such that f ∗ g = f ∗ y, g  = y.
Proof. For two polynomials to be equal, each of their coeﬃcients must be equal. Thus, we may
express the condition f ∗ g = f ∗ y as follows for each ℓ ≥ 0:
(f ∗ g)[ℓ] =
ℓ  
j=0
f[ℓ − j]g[j]
(f ∗ y)[ℓ] =
ℓ  
j=0
f[ℓ − j]y[j]
ℓ  
j=0
f[ℓ − j](g[j] − y[j]) = 0
We prove by induction that g[ℓ] = y[ℓ] (0 ≤ ℓ ≤ deg(g)). As a base case, we prove that
g[deg(g)] = y[deg(g)]:
deg(f)+deg(g)  
j=0
f[deg(f) + deg(g) − j](g[j] − y[j]) = 0
f[deg(f)](g[deg(g)] − y[deg(g)]) = 0
Because f[deg(f)] ∈ R∗ (by deﬁnition, f[deg(f)]  = 0), by Lemma 20 g[deg(g)] = y[deg(g)].
We now make the strong inductive assumption that for i ≤ ℓ ≤ deg(g), g[ℓ] = y[ℓ]. Next, we
use this assumption to prove that g[i − 1] = y[i − 1]:
deg(f)+i−1  
j=0
f[deg(f) + i − 1 − j](g[j] − y[j]) = 0
deg(f)+i−1  
j=0
f[deg(f) + i − 1 − j](g[j] − y[j]) = f[deg(f)](g[i − 1] − y[i − 1])
f[deg(f)](g[i − 1] − y[i − 1]) = 0
Because f[deg(f)] ∈ R∗ (by deﬁnition, f[deg(f)]  = 0), by Lemma 20 g[i − 1] = y[i − 1]. Thus,
by the inductive principle, all coeﬃcients of g are identical to those of y up to deg(g). We now
prove that deg(y) ≤ deg(g), showing that y = g (and thus that our lemma is true).
If deg(y) > deg(g) then ∃ℓ>deg(g) y[ℓ]  = 0 (let ℓ be the minimal such index):
g[ℓ] = 0
g[ℓ] − y[ℓ]  = 0
i  
j=0
f[i − j](g[j] − y[j]) = 0
24We may remove from the sum all terms for which g[j] − y[j] = 0, leaving us with the following
equation for some i ≤ deg(f):
f[deg(f)](g[ℓ] − y[ℓ]) = 0
Because f[deg(f)] ∈ R∗ (by deﬁnition, f[deg(f)]  = 0), by Lemma 20 y[ℓ] = g[ℓ] = 0. Thus, no
such index ℓ can exist; deg(y) ≤ deg(g). Because we also know that all terms of y up to deg(g)
are identical to those of g, we may conclude that y = g, and thus that our lemma is true.
Lemma 22. For all polynomials f1,f2,g1,g2 ∈ R[x] such that f1 ∗g1 = f2 ∗g2, gcd(f1,f2) = 1,
then f2 | g1.
Proof. We deﬁned gcd(f1,f2) with f1,f2 ∈ R[x] as the output of Euclid’s algorithm for calcu-
lating the gcd (which succeeds with overwhelming probability by Lemma 19). Note that from
the intermediate results of this calculation we can determine polynomials p1,p2 ∈ R[x] such
that p1 ∗ f1 + p2 ∗ f2 = 1, as gcd(f1,f2) = 1.
p1 ∗ f1 + p2 ∗ f2 = 1
p1 ∗ f1 = 1 − p2 ∗ f2
g1 ∗ p1 ∗ f1 = g1(1 − p2 ∗ f2)
p1 ∗ (f2 ∗ g2) = g1(1 − p2 ∗ f2)
g1 = f2 (p1 ∗ g2 + p2 ∗ g1)
Because there exists a polynomial p1∗g2+p2∗g1 ∈ R[x] such that g1 = f2 (p1 ∗ g2 + p2 ∗ g1),
f2 | g1.
Lemma 2. Let f,g be polynomials in R[x] where R is a ring such that no PPT adversary
can ﬁnd the size of its subﬁelds with non-negligible probability, deg(f) = deg(g) = α, β ≥ α,
gcd(f,g) = 1, and f[deg(f)] ∈ R∗ ∧ g[deg(g)] ∈ R∗. Let r =
 β
i=0 r[i]xi and s =
 β
i=0 s[i]xi,
where ∀0≤i≤β r[i] ← R, ∀0≤i≤β s[i] ← R (independently).
Let u = f ∗ r + g ∗ s =
 α+β
i=0 u[i]xi. Then ∀0≤i≤α+β u[i] are distributed uniformly and
independently over R.
Proof. For clarity, we give a brief outline of the proof before proceeding to the details. Given
any ﬁxed polynomials f,g,u, we calculate the number z of r,s pairs such that f ∗r +g ∗s = u.
We may then check that, given any ﬁxed polynomials f,g, the total number of possible r,s
pairs, divided by z, is equal to the number of possible result polynomials u. This implies that,
if gcd(f,g) = 1 and we choose the coeﬃcients of r,s uniformly and independently from R, the
coeﬃcients of the result polynomial u are distributed uniformly and independently over R.
We now determine the value of z, the number of r,s pairs such that f ∗r+g ∗s = u. Let us
assume that for this particular u there exists at least one pair ˆ r, ˆ s such that f ∗ ˆ r + g ∗ ˆ s = u.
For any pair ˆ r′, ˆ s′ such that f ∗ ˆ r′ + g ∗ ˆ s′ = u, then
f ∗ ˆ r + g ∗ ˆ s = f ∗ ˆ r′ + g ∗ ˆ s′
f ∗ (ˆ r − ˆ r′) = g ∗ (ˆ s′ − ˆ s)
As gcd(f,g) = 1, we may conclude that g|(ˆ r−ˆ r′) and f|(ˆ s′−ˆ s) by Lemma 22. Let p∗g = ˆ r−ˆ r′
and p ∗ f = ˆ s′ − ˆ s.
We must now show that each polynomial p, of degree at most β − α, determines exactly
one unique pair ˆ r′, ˆ s′ such that f ∗ ˆ r′ + g ∗ ˆ s′ = u, and that there exist no pairs ˆ r′, ˆ s′ such that
f ∗ˆ r′ +g∗ˆ s′ = u that are not generated by a single choice of the polynomial p of degree at most
β − α.
25To show that there exist no pairs ˆ r′, ˆ s′ such that f ∗ ˆ r′ +g∗ ˆ s′ = u that are not generated by
some choice of the polynomial p, of degree at most β −α, we let p′ ∗g = ˆ r−ˆ r′ and p∗f = ˆ s′−ˆ s
for any p′,p of degree at most β−α. As we proved that g|(ˆ r−ˆ r′) and f|(ˆ s′−ˆ s), we can represent
f and g in this fashion without loss of generality.
f ∗ (ˆ r − ˆ r′) = g ∗ (ˆ s′ − ˆ s)
f ∗ (p′ ∗ g) = g ∗ (p ∗ f)
As the leading coeﬃcients of f and g are members of (R∗ ∪ {0}), we may apply Lemma 21 to
remove both f and g from our equation, leaving the fact that p = p′. Thus, there exist no pairs
ˆ r′, ˆ s′ such that f ∗ ˆ r′ + g ∗ ˆ s′ = u that are not generated by some choice of the polynomial p, of
degree at most β − α.
To show that each polynomial p, of degree at most β − α, determines exactly one unique
pair ˆ r′, ˆ s′ such that f ∗ ˆ r′ + g ∗ ˆ s′ = u, note that ˆ r′ = ˆ r − g ∗ p, ˆ s′ = ˆ s + f ∗ p; as we have ﬁxed
f,g, ˆ r, ˆ s, a choice of p determines both ˆ r′, ˆ s′ . If these assignments were not unique, there would
exist polynomials p,p′ such that either ˆ r′ = ˆ r − g ∗ p = ˆ r − g ∗ p′ or ˆ s′ = ˆ s + f ∗ p = ˆ s + f ∗ p′.
These conditions imply that either g ∗ p = g ∗ p′ or f ∗ p = f ∗ p′ for some polynomials p  = p′;
we know this is impossible (when the leading coeﬃcients of f and g are members of R∗ ∪ {0})
by Lemma 21.
Thus the number of polynomials p, of degree at most β − α, is exactly equivalent to the
number of r,s pairs such that f ∗ r + g ∗ s = u. As there are |R|β−α+1 such polynomials p,
z = |R|β−α+1.
We now show that the total number of r,s pairs, divided by z, is equal to the number of
result polynomials u. There are |R|2β+2 r,s pairs. As
|R|
2β+2
z =
|R|
2β+2
|R|β−α+1 = |R|α+β+1, and there
are |R|α+β+1 possible result polynomials, we have proved the theorem true.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 23. For all polynomials q ∈ R[x], t ≥ 0,m ≥ 1, (x − a)m | ((x − a)t+mq)
(t)
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction.
As a base case, we prove the lemma for t = 0.
((x − a)mq)
(0) = (x − a)mq
Thus, (x − a)m | ((x − a)mq)
(0)
Next, we make the inductive assumption for t = i: (x − a)m |
 
(x − a)i+mq
 (i)
. Using this
assumption, we may prove the lemma holds for t = i + 1.
 
(x − a)
m+i+1q
 (i+1)
=
 
(m + i + 1)(x − a)
m+iq − (x − a)
m+i+1q
(1)
 (i)
=
 
(x − a)m+i
 
(m + i + 1)q − (x − a)q(1)
  (i)
Thus, by the inductive assumption, (x−a)m |
 
(x − a)m+i+1q
 (i+1)
. By the inductive principle,
our lemma holds.
Lemma 24. For all polynomials q ∈ R[x] such that (x − a) ∤ q, t ≥ 0, m ≥ 1, (x − a)m−t+1 ∤
((x − a)m ∗ q)
(t)
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction. Note that we may uniquely represent q as (x−a)b1+r
such that r  = 0 and deg(r) < 1.
26As a base case, we prove the lemma for t = 0.
((x − a)mq)
(0) = (x − a)mq
= (x − a)
m((x − a)b1 + r)
= (x − a)m+1b1 + (x − a)mr
Because (x−a)mr  = 0, deg(r) < 1, and (x−a)m+1 ∤ (x−a)mr, we know that deg((x − a)mr) <
deg
 
(x − a)m+1 
, and (x − a)m+1 ∤ ((x − a)mq)
(0).
Next, we make the inductive assumption for t = k: (x − a)m−k+1 ∤ ((x − a)m ∗ q)
(k). Using
this assumption, we may prove that the lemma holds for t = k + 1.
((x − a)m ∗ q)
(k+1) =
 
m(x − a)m−1q + (x − a)mq(1)
 (k)
=
 
(x − a)
m−1
 
mq + (x − a)q
(1)
  (k)
Let m′ = m − 1 and q′ = mq + (x − a)q(1). We know through the inductive assumption that:
(x − a)m
′−k+1 ∤
 
(x − a)m
′
q′
 (k)
(x − a)(m−1)−k+1 ∤
 
(x − a)m−1q′ (k)
(x − a)m−(k+1)+1 ∤
 
(x − a)m−1
 
mq + (x − a)q(1)
  (k)
∤ ((x − a)
m ∗ q)
(k+1)
Thus, by the inductive principle, our lemma holds.
Lemma 25. For all polynomials q ∈ R[x] such that (x − a) ∤ q, (x − a) ∤ ((x − a)tq)
(t).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction. Note that we may uniquely represent q as (x−a)b1+r
such that r  = 0 and deg(r) < 1.
As a base case, we prove the lemma for t = 0.
 
(x − a)0q
 (0)
= q
Because (x − a) ∤ q, (x − a) ∤
 
(x − a)0q
 (0)
.
Next, we make the inductive assumption for t = i: (x − a) ∤
 
(x − a)iq
 (i)
. Using this
assumption, we may prove that the lemma holds for t = i + 1.
 
(x − a)
i+1q
 (i+1)
=
 
(i + 1)(x − a)
iq + (x − a)
i+1q
(1)
 (i)
=
 
(i + 1)(x − a)iq
 (i)
+
 
(x − a)i+1q(1)
 (i)
By Lemma 23, (x − a) |
 
(x − a)i+1q(1) (i)
. Thus, for some unique polynomial b2 ∈ R[x],
 
(x − a)i+1q(1) (i)
= (x−a)b2. By the inductive assumption, (x−a) ∤
 
(i + 1)(x − a)iq
 (i)
. Thus,
for some unique polynomials b3,r3 ∈ R[x] (such that r3  = 0,deg(r3) < 1),
 
(i + 1)(x − a)iq
 (i)
=
(x − a)b3 + r3.
 
(x − a)i+1q
 (i+1)
= ((x − a)b3 + r3) + ((x − a)b2)
= (x − a)(b3 + b2) + r3
27As r3  = 0,deg(r3) < 1, (x − a) ∤
 
(x − a)i+1q
 (i+1)
. By the inductive principle, our lemma
holds.
Lemma 4.
Let Fj ∈ R[x] (0 ≤ j ≤ d) each of degree j such that gcd(F0,...,Fd) = 1. For all elements
a ∈ R such that ∀0≤j≤d (x − a) ∤ Fj, q ∈ R[X] such that (x − a) ∤ q, and rj ← Rm+deg(q)[x]
(0 ≤ j ≤ d), and:
• if m > d, f = (x − a)m ∗ q → (x − a)m−d |
 d
j=0 f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj ∧ (x − a)m−d+1 ∤
 d
j=0 f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj
• if m ≤ d, f = (x − a)m ∗ q → (x − a) ∤
 d
j=0 f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj
with overwhelming probability.
Proof. • If m ≤ d, by Lemma 25, there exists with overwhelming probability at least one
index j (0 ≤ j ≤ d) such that (x − a) ∤ ((x − a)m ∗ q)
(j) Fj ∗ rj
3. Let A = {j | (x −
a) ∤ ((x − a)m ∗ q)
(j) Fj ∗ rj} and B = {j | 0 ≤ j ≤ d ∧ j  ∈ A}. Each polynomial
((x − a)m ∗ q)
(j) Fj ∗ rj can be represented as (x − a)qj + sj. By the deﬁnition of A and
B, ∀j∈A sj  = 0 and ∀j∈B sj = 0.
d  
j=0
((x − a)m ∗ q)
(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj =


 
j∈A
((x − a)m ∗ q)
(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj

 +


 
j∈B
((x − a)m ∗ q)
(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj


=
 
j∈A
((x − a)qj + sj) +
 
j∈B
((x − a)qj)
= (x − a)
d  
j=0
qj +
 
j∈A
sj
Note that
 
j∈A sj  = 0 with overwhelming probability. Thus, as deg
  
j∈A sj
 
< 1, we
may conclude that (x − a) ∤
 d
j=0 ((x − a)mq)
(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj with overwhelming probability.
• If m > d, by Lemma 23, (x−a)d−m | f(j) for 0 ≤ j ≤ d. Thus, by the distributive property
over rings, (x−a)m−d |
 d
j=0 f(j)∗Fj∗rj. Note also that by Lemma 24, (x−a)d−m+1 ∤ f(d).
By the analysis above, with overwhelming probability, f = (x−a)m ∗q → (x −a)m−d+1 ∤  d
j=0 f(j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj.
C Proofs for Set-Intersection and Cardinality Set-
Intersection Protocols
C.1 Set-Intersection
In this section, we give proofs of security and correctness for our protocols for Set-Intersection
in the honest-but-curious and malicious cases. For simplicity, we give proof sketches for these
theorems.
3Note that (x − a) ∤ rj with overwhelming probability, as rj is random and of polynomial size.
28C.1.1 Honest-But-Curious Case
Theorem 6: In the Set-Intersection protocol of Fig. 1, every player learns the intersection of
all players’ private inputs, S1 ∩ S2 ∩     ∩ Sn, with overwhelming probability.
Proof. Each player learns the decrypted polynomial p =
 n
i=1 fi ∗
  c
j=0 ri+j,j
 
. If
∀i∈[n] fi(a) = 0, then p(a) = 0. As no elements that are not in every players’ private in-
put can be in the set-intersection of all private inputs, all elements in the set-intersection can
be recovered by each player. Each element in his private input that a root of p is a member of
the intersection set.
We now show that, with high probability, erroneous elements are not inserted into the answer
set. Note that, by the reasoning of Lemma 19, all coeﬃcients of fi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are in the set
R∗ ∪{0}. Thus, by Lemma 2, the decrypted polynomial is of the form
  
a∈I(x − a)
 
∗s, where
s is uniformly distributed over R2k−|I|[x]. This random polynomial s is of polynomial size, and
thus has a polynomial number of roots. Each of these roots is a representation of an element from
P with only negligible probability. Thus, the probability that an erroneous element is included
in the answer set is also negligible, and all players learn exactly the intersection set.
Theorem 7: Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is se-
mantically secure, with overwhelming probability, in the Set-Intersection protocol of Fig. 1, any
coalition of fewer than n PPT honest-but-curious players learns no more information than would
be gained by using the same private inputs in the ideal model with a trusted third party.
Proof. We assume that the homomorphic cryptosystem (E,D) used in the protocol is in fact
secure as we required. Thus, as the inputs of the other players are all encrypted until the
decryption is performed, nothing can be learned by any player before that point. Each player j
then learns only the summed polynomial p =
 n
i=1 fi ∗
  c
j=0 ri+j,j
 
.
Note that to every coalition of c players, for every i,
 c
j=0 ri+j,j is completely random, as
at least one player in the c + 1 players who chose that random polynomial is not a member of
the coalition, and so
 c
j=0 ri+j,j is uniformly distributed and unknown.
Note that, by the reasoning of Lemma 19, all coeﬃcients of fi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are in the set
R∗ ∪ {0}. Thus, by Lemma 2, p =
 n
i=1 fi ∗
  c
j=0 ri+j,j
 
=
  
a∈I(x − a)
 
∗s, where I is the
intersection set and s is uniformly distributed over the polynomials of appropriate degree. Thus
no information about the private inputs of the honest players can be recovered from p, other
than that given by revealing the intersection set.
C.1.2 Malicious Case
Theorem 16: Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is
semantically secure, and the speciﬁed zero-knowledge proofs and proofs of correct decryption
cannot be forged, then in the Set-Intersection protocol for the malicious case in Fig. 7, for any
coalition Γ of colluding players (at most n−1 such colluding parties), there is a player (or group
of players) G operating in the ideal model, such that the views of the players in the ideal model is
computationally indistinguishable from the views of the honest players and Γ in the real model.
Proof. In this simulation proof, we give an algorithm for a player G in the ideal model. This
player communicates with the malicious players Γ, pretending to be one or more honest players
in such a fashion that Γ cannot distinguish that he is not in the real world. We assume that all
malicious players can collude. The trusted third party takes the input from G and the honest
parties, and gives both G and the honest parties the intersection set. G then communicates
with the malicious players Γ, so they also learn the intersection set. A graphical representation
of these players is given in Figure 10
29We give a sketch of how the player G operates (note that G can prevaricate when opening
commitments, as we use an equivocal commitment scheme, and can extract plaintext from proofs
of plaintext knowledge):
1. For each simulated honest player i, G:
(a) chooses a polynomial fi such that each such polynomial is relatively prime and has
leading coeﬃcient 1 (for randomly generated polynomials with leading coeﬃcient 1,
this is true with overwhelming probability)
(b) chooses arbitrary polynomials ri,1,...,ri,n and creates encryptions Λ(ri,j) from them
(in the case of Paillier, specially construct encryptions of those polynomials, and
proofs of knowledge of each coeﬃcient, see Section 7.1)
2. Performs step 1 of the protocol:
(a) sends the encryption of fi to all malicious players Γ, along with proofs of plaintext
knowledge and commitments to Λ(ri,j) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
(b) sends data items Λ(ri,j) (1 ≤ j ≤ n) to all malicious players Γ
(c) Receives from each malicious player α ∈ Γ:
i. encryption of a polynomial fα and proofs of plaintext knowledge for its coeﬃcients
ii. trapdoor commitments to data items Λ(rα,j) for each random polynomial rα,j,
1 ≤ j ≤ n
3. The player G extracts from the proofs of plaintext knowledge and trapdoor commitments
to Λ(ri,j) (in the case of Paillier, the extraction is from the proof of knowledge of the
discrete logarithm), the polynomials fα, and the random polynomials rα,j the malicious
players Γ have chosen.
4. G obtains the roots of each polynomial fα (as these exactly determine, for the purposes
of the protocol, his set):
• If polynomial factoring is possible, G may factor fα. fα(a) = 0 ⇔ (x − a)|fα, so all
roots of fα may be determined by examining the linear factors.
• If we are working in the random oracle model, then, with overwhelming probability, to
correctly represent any element of the valid set P, a player must consult the random
oracle. As there can be only a polynomial number of such queries, for each query a,
G may check if fα(a || h(a)) = 0.
• If neither of these routes are feasible, then a proof that fα was constructed by mul-
tiplying k linear factors of the form x − a may be added to the protocol instead of
proofs of plaintext knowledge. This proof is of size O(k3), and is constructed by using
proofs of plaintext knowledge for some linear factors, and layering proofs of correct
multiplication to obtain the complete polynomial fα. From this proof, each linear
factor of fα can be obtained, and thus all roots of fα.
5. G submits the sets represented by these roots to the trusted third party. The honest player
submit their private input sets to the trusted third party. The trusted third party returns
the intersection set I to G and the honest players.
6. G prepares to reveal the intersection set to the malicious players Γ:
(a) selects a target polynomial p =
  
a∈I(x − a)
 
∗ s, where s is chosen uniformly from
those polynomials of degree 2k−|I|. (note that, by Lemma 2, this is exactly the poly-
nomial calculated by simply running the protocol, as by the reasoning of Lemma 19,
all coeﬃcients of fi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are in the set R∗ ∪ {0}.)
(b) chooses a set of polynomials ri,j (where i is one of the simulated honest players)
such that
 n
i=1 fi
  n
j=1 ri,j
 
= p (from the proof of Lemma 2, we know that such
polynomials exist, and can be determined through simple polynomial manipulation)
7. G follows the rest of the protocol with the malicious players Γ as written, except that he
opens the trapdoor commitment to reveal an appropriate Λ(ri,j) for the new chosen ri,j.
30In this way, the players calculate an encryption of the polynomial p chosen by G, and then
decrypt it. The coalition players thus learn the intersection set.
Note that the dishonest players cannot distinguish that they are talking to G (who is working
in the ideal model) instead of other clients (in the real world), and the correct answer is learned
by all parties, in both the real and ideal models.
C.2 Cardinality Set-Intersection
In this section, we give proofs of security and correctness for our protocols for Set-Intersection
in the honest-but-curious and malicious cases. For simplicity, we give proof sketches for these
theorems.
C.2.1 Honest-But-Curious Case
Theorem 8: In the Cardinality Set-Intersection protocol of Fig. 2, every player learns the
size of the intersection of all players’ private inputs, |S1 ∩ S2 ∩     ∩ Sn|, with overwhelming
probability.
Proof. Note that, following the proof of Theorem 6, p is a polynomial representation of the
intersection multiset, with overwhelming probability. Each player evaluates p (encrypted) at
each of their inputs, then blinds it by homomorphically multiplying a random element by the
encrypted evaluation. Thus each resulting encrypted element (Vi)j (1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k) is
either 0, representing some element of a private input set in the intersection set, or uniformly
distributed, representing some element not in the intersection set. An element is a member of
S1∩   ∩Sn if and only if each player holds it as part of their private input set, for each element of
S1∩   ∩Sn, there are n encrypted evaluations that are 0. Thus, when the encrypted evaluations
(Vi)j (1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k) are shuﬄed and decrypted, there are exactly n|S1 ∩     ∩ Sn| 0s,
and thus all players learn the size of the intersection set.
Theorem 9: Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is se-
mantically secure and that the Shuﬄe protocol is secure, with overwhelming probability, in the
Cardinality Set-Intersection protocol of Fig. 2, any coalition of fewer than n PPT honest-but-
curious players learns no more information than would be gained by using the same private
inputs in the ideal model with a trusted third party.
Proof. We assume that the cryptosystem Epk( ) and Shuﬄe protocol are secure, so we may
note that no player or coalition of players learns any information from the protocol except the
decryption of the randomly-ordered set {(Vi)j}i∈[n],j∈[k]. As each element of that set is either 0
or a uniformly distributed element, it conveys no information other than the statement ‘some
player had an element in their private input set that was/was not in the intersection set’. As
this information precisely constitutes the result of the Cardinality Set-Intersection problem, no
additional information is revealed.
C.2.2 Malicious Case
Theorem 17: Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is
semantically secure, the Shuﬄe protocol is secure, and the speciﬁed zero-knowledge proofs and
proofs of correct decryption cannot be forged, then in the Cardinality Set-Intersection protocol
for the malicious case in Fig. 8, for any coalition Γ of colluding players (at most n − 1 such
colluding parties), there is a player (or group of players) G operating in the ideal model, such
that the views of the players in the ideal model is computationally indistinguishable from the
views of the honest players and Γ in the real model.
31Proof. The simulation proof of this theorem follows the proof of Theorem 16 with only small
changes; the additional zero-knowledge proofs in the protocol are generally irrelevant to the
simulator.
D Proofs for the Over-Threshold Set-Union and Thresh-
old Set-Union Protocols
D.1 Over-Threshold Set-Union
D.1.1 Honest-But-Curious Case
Theorem 10: In the Over-Threshold Set-Union protocol of Fig. 3, every honest-but-curious
player learns each element a which appears at least t times in the union of the n players’ private
inputs, as well as the number of times it so appears, with overwhelming probability.
Proof. All players calculate and decrypt Φ =
 d
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗
  c+1
i=1 ri,ℓ
 
. As
 c+1
i=1 ri,ℓ (0 ≤
ℓ ≤ t − 1) are distributed uniformly over all polynomials of approximate size nk and, by the
reasoning of Lemma 19, all coeﬃcients of p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ (0 ≤ ℓ ≤ t − 1) are in the set R∗ ∪ {0},
Lemma 2 tells us that Φ = gcd
 
p(t−1),p(t−2),...,p
 
∗u, where u is a random polynomial of the
appropriate size. As u has only a polynomial number of roots, each of which has a negligable
probability of representing a member of P, u is a polynomial representation of the empty set
with overwhelming probability.
By Theorem 4, gcd
 
p(t−1),p(t−2),...,p
 
has roots which are exactly those that appear at
least t times in the players’ private inputs (the threshold set). The players calculate elements
ui,j, which are uniformly distributed if (Si)j is not a member of the threshold set, and (Si)j if
it does appear in the threshold set. These elements are shuﬄed and distributed to all players.
Each reveals an element of the private input, if that element is in the threshold set, and nothing
otherwise. Thus each element in the threshold intersection set is revealed as many times as it
appeared in the private inputs.
Theorem 11: Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is
semantically secure, with overwhelming probability, in the Over-Threshold Set-Union protocol of
Fig. 3, any coalition of fewer than n PPT honest-but-curious players learns no more information
than would be gained by using the same private inputs in the ideal model with a trusted third
party.
Proof. We assume that the cryptosystem employed is semantically secure, and so play-
ers learn only the formula Φ =
 d
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗
  c+1
i=1 ri,ℓ
 
. Note that
 c+1
i=1 ri,ℓ (0 ≤
ℓ ≤ t − 1) are uniformly distributed and unknown to all players, as the maximum coali-
tion size is smaller than c + 1. Note that by the reasoning of Lemma 19, all coeﬃcients
of p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ (0 ≤ ℓ ≤ t − 1) are in the set R∗ ∪ {0}. Thus, by Theorem 2, Φ =
gcd
 
p(t−1) ∗ Ft−1,p(t−2) ∗ Ft−2,...,p ∗ F0
 
∗ s, for some uniformly distributed polynomial s.
As s is uniformly distributed for any player inputs, no player or coalition can learn more than
gcd
 
p(t−1),p(t−2),...,p
 
. F0,...,Ft−1 are chosen such that gcd(p,F0,...,Ft−1) = 1 with over-
whelming probability, and so gcd
 
p(t−1) ∗ Ft−1,p(t−2) ∗ Ft−2,...,p ∗ F0
 
= gcd
 
p,p(t−1) ∗ F
 
=
gcd
 
p(t−1),p(t−2),...,p
 
with overwhelming probability. As was observed in Theorem 10, this
information exactly represents the threshold set, and can thus be derived from the answer that
would be returned by a trusted third party. Thus no player or coalition of at most c players can
learn more than in the ideal model.
Neither do the shuﬄed elements reveal additional information. As we assume the shuﬄing
protocol is secure, the origin of any element is not revealed. The elements revealed are exactly
32those in the threshold set, each included as many times as it was included in the private inputs,
and thus also do not reveal information to any adversary.
D.1.2 Malicious Case
Theorem 18: Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is
semantically secure, the Shuﬄe protocol is secure, and the speciﬁed zero-knowledge proofs and
proofs of correct decryption cannot be forged, then in the Over-Threshold Set-Union protocol for
the malicious case in Fig. 8, for any coalition Γ of colluding players (at most n−1 such colluding
parties), there is a player (or group of players) G operating in the ideal model, such that the
views of the players in the ideal model is computationally indistinguishable from the views of the
honest players and Γ in the real model.
Proof. In this simulation proof, we give an algorithm for a player G in the ideal model. This
player communicates with the malicious players Γ, pretending to be one or more honest players
in such a fashion that Γ cannot distinguish that he is not in the real world. We assume that all
malicious players can collude. The trusted third party takes the input from G and the honest
parties, and gives both G and the honest parties the intersection set. G then communicates
with the malicious players Γ, so they also learn the intersection set. A graphical representation
of these players is given in Figure 10.
We give a sketch of how the player G operates (note that G can prevaricate when opening
commitments, as we use an equivocal commitment scheme, and can extract plaintext from proofs
of plaintext knowledge):
1. For each simulated honest player i, G:
(a) chooses a set S′
i of arbitrary elements (S′
i)1,...,(S′
i)k ∈ R
(b) Performs steps 1−2 of the protocol, sending equivocal commitments to the set Si for
each simulated honest player.
2. The player G extracts the private input sets chosen by Γ, for each malicious player, from
the equivocal commitments sent in step 2 of the protocol. G submits the sets extracted
from these commitments to the trusted third party. The honest player submit their private
input sets to the trusted third party. The trusted third party returns the result set I to
G and the honest players.
3. G prepares to reveal the intersection set to the malicious players Γ: G chooses new sets Si
to replace the sets S′
i used to construct the commitment. These sets are chosen to contain
the following elements:
(a) for each element a that appears b > 0 in I, and bΓ times in the private input multisets
of the malicious players (Γ), the element a is included b + t − 1 − bΓ times in the
multisets Si
(b) all elements not speciﬁed by the prior rule are chosen uniformly from R
4. G follows the rest of the protocol with the malicious players Γ as written. The coalition
players thus learn the result set.
Note that the dishonest players cannot distinguish that they are talking to G (who is working
in the ideal model) instead of other clients (in the real world), and the correct answer is learned
by all parties, in both the real and ideal models.
D.2 Threshold Set-Union
Theorem 12: In the Threshold Contribution Threshold Set-Union protocol of Fig. 5, every
player i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) learns the set Si ∩ Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), with overwhelming probability.
33Proof. Note that the encrypted computation is performed in accordance with Theorems 3 and 5,
and thus the polynomial Φ is a polynomial representation of the multiset Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪Sn),
with overwhelming probability. Each player i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) constructs encrypted evaluations of
each a ∈ Si, which are them homomorphically multiplied by a uniformly distributed element
by all players. Thus, each ciphertext constructed in this fashion is either 0 (meaning a ∈
Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn)) or uniformly distributed (meaning a  ∈ Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn)). These
ciphertexts are then decrypted; thus, each player i learns which elements of his private input
appear in the threshold set Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 13: In the Semi-Perfect Threshold Set-Union protocol of Fig. 4, each player i (1 ≤
i ≤ n) learns the set Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), with overwhelming probability.
Proof. Following the proof of Theorem 12, the polynomial Φ is a polynomial representation
of the multiset Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), with overwhelming probability and each shuﬄed element
T || U is of one of the following forms:
• For some a ∈ S1 ∪     ∪ Sn, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, T = Enci(h(a) || a), U is an Epk(a) – thus,
a ∈ Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn)
• For some a ∈ S1 ∪     ∪ Sn, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, T = Enci(h(a) || a), U is not an Epk(a) – thus,
a  ∈ Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn)
The operation of Step 8 assures that for each a ∈ Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), a corresponding U
is correctly decrypted exactly once – all other decryptions of a are sabotaged to appear uni-
formly distributed. Thus, all players learn the elements of the set Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), with
overwhelming probability.
Theorem 14: In the Perfect Threshold Set-Union protocol of Fig. 6, every player learns the
set Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), with overwhelming probability.
Proof. Following the proof of Theorem 12, the polynomial Φ is a polynomial representation of
the multiset Rdt−1(S1 ∪   ∪Sn), with overwhelming probability and each shuﬄed (encrypted)
element U′
ℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ nk) is of one of the following forms: a ∈ P (indicating that a ∈ Rdt−1(S1 ∪
   ∪Sn)), or a uniformly distributed element (which can be distinguished from a representation
of an element of P with overwhelming probability). Note that, if U′
ℓ is an encryption of an
element a, and ¬∃ℓ′∈[ℓ−1] U′
ℓ′ such that U′
ℓ′ is also an encryption of a, then Wℓ is also an
encryption of a. (Otherwise, Wℓ is an encryption of a uniformly distributed element.)
This calculation results in a list of encrypted elements Wℓ, each of which is of one of the
following forms: a ∈ P (indicating that both: a ∈ Rdt−1(S1 ∪     ∪ Sn), and Wℓ is with
overwhelming probability the only encryption of a in the list), or a uniformly distributed element.
Thus, when the players decrypt the list Wℓ, they learn all elements of Rdt−1(S1∪   ∪Sn) exactly
once, with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 15: Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem Epk( ) is
semantically secure and that the Shuﬄe protocol is secure, with overwhelming probability, in the
Threshold Set-Union protocols of Figs. 4, 5, and 6, any coalition of fewer than n PPT honest-
but-curious players learns no more information than would be gained by using the same private
inputs in the ideal model with a trusted third party.
Proof. Note that in the threshold contribution and perfect variants of Threshold Set-Union, all
data is encrypted until the ﬁnal result sets are revealed through joint decryption. As shown in
Theorems 12 and 14, the ﬁnal sets correspond exactly to the elements revealed (all elements
that are not in the result set are uniformly distributed over R, and thus hold no information),
no information except the result set is revealed to the players.
34In the protocol for semi-perfect Threshold Set-Union, the result set is not decrypted all-
at-once, but one element at a time. Theorem 13 shows the the resulting elements correspond
exactly to the desired result set, but we must show that the behavior of each player during the
process of decryption yields no disallowed information. Note that we require for the security of
this protocol that a dishonest coalition hold no more than t − 1 copies of any given element in
their private input sets.
When performing the decryption process, each player learns two pieces of information when
a result set element is revealed: the element, and whether the element revealed came from that
player’s own private input multiset. Each ciphertext is ‘tagged’, so each player can easily decide
whether they constructed that ciphertext. Thus, if a dishonest coalition held at least t copies
of any given element, they could determine that at least one other player also held a copy of
that element, revealing forbidden information. However, as we have precluded this situation, no
information is revealed; if a dishonest coalition holds t − 1 copies of an element which appears
in the result set, they already know that at least one other player holds it (otherwise it would
not appear in the result set!).
35Protocol: Threshold-SemiPerfect-HBC
Input: There are n ≥ 2 honest-but-curious players, c < n dishonestly colluding, each with
a private input set Si, such that |Si| = k. The players share the secret key sk, to which pk
is the corresponding public key for a homomorphic cryptosystem. The threshold number of
repetitions at which an element appears in the output is t. F0,...,Ft−1 are ﬁxed polynomials
of degree 0,...,t − 1 which have no common factors or roots representing elements of P.
1. Each player i = 1,...,n calculates the polynomial fi = (x − (Si)1)...(x − (Si)k)
2. Player 1 sends the encryption of the polynomial λ1 = f1 to player 2
3. Each player i = 2,...,n
(a) receives the encryption of the polynomial λi−1 from player i − 1
(b) calculates the encryption of the polynomial λi = λi−1 ∗ fi by utilizing the algo-
rithm given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(c) sends the encryption of the polynomial λi to player i + 1 mod n
4. Player 1 distributes the encryption of the polynomial p = λn =
 n
i=1 fi to players
2,...,c + 1
5. Each player i = 1,...,c + 1
(a) calculates the encryption of the 1,..,t − 1th derivatives of p, denoted
p(1),...,p(t−1), by repeating the algorithm given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(b) chooses random polynomials ri,0,...,ri,t−1 ← Rnk[x]
(c) calculates the encryption of the polynomial
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗ ri,ℓ and sends it to
all other players.
6. Each player i = 1,...,n
(a) evaluates the encryption of the polynomial Φ =
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗
  c+1
i=1 ri,ℓ
 
at
each input (Si)j, obtaining encrypted elements Epk(cij) where cij = Φ((Si)j),
using the algorithm given in Sec. 4.2.2
(b) for each j = 1,...,k calculates an encrypted tag Tij = Enci(h((Si)j) || (Si)j)
(c) for each j = 1,...,k chooses a random number rij ← R and calculates an
encrypted element Uij = (rij ×h Epk(cij)) +h Epk((Si)j)
(d) constructs the set Vi = {(Tij || Uij) | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}
7. By using the Shuﬄe protocol, players perform shuﬄing on their private input sets Vi.
8. For each shuﬄed element T || U in sorted order, each player i = 1,...,n
(a) if Di(T) = h(a) || a for some a
i. if a has previously been revealed to be in the threshold set, then calculate
an incorrect decryption share of U, and send it to all other players
(b) else calculate a decryption share of U, and send it to all other players
(c) reconstruct the decryption of U. If the element a ∈ P, then a is in the threshold
result set
Figure 4: Threshold Set-Union protocol secure against honest-but-curious adversaries (semi-perfect
variant).
36Protocol: Threshold-Contribution-HBC
Input: There are n ≥ 2 honest-but-curious players, c < n dishonestly colluding, each with
a private input set Si, such that |Si| = k. The players share the secret key sk, to which pk
is the corresponding public key for a homomorphic cryptosystem. The threshold number of
repetitions at which an element appears in the output is t. F is a ﬁxed polynomial of degree
t − 1 which has no roots representing elements of P. The threshold number of repetitions
at which an element appears in the output is t ≥ 2. F0,...,Ft−1 are ﬁxed polynomials of
degree 0,...,t − 1 which have no common factors or roots representing elements of P.
1. Each player i = 1,...,n calculates the polynomial fi = (x − (Si)1)...(x − (Si)k)
2. Player 1 sends the encryption of the polynomial λ1 = f1 to player 2
3. Each player i = 2,...,n
(a) receives the encryption of the polynomial λi−1 from player i − 1
(b) calculates the encryption of the polynomial λi = λi−1 ∗ fi by utilizing the algo-
rithm given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(c) sends the encryption of the polynomial λi to player i + 1 mod n
4. Player 1 distributes the encryption of the polynomial p = λn =
 n
i=1 fi to players
2,...,c + 1
5. Each player i = 1,...,c + 1
(a) calculates the encryption of the 1,..,t − 1th derivatives of p, denoted
p(1),...,p(t−1), by repeating the algorithm given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(b) chooses random polynomials ri,0,...,ri,t−1 ← Rnk[x]
(c) calculates the encryption of the polynomial
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗ ri,ℓ and sends it to
all other players.
6. Each player i = 1,...,n
(a) evaluates the encryption of the polynomial Φ =
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗
  c+1
i=1 ri,ℓ
 
at
each input (Si)j, obtaining encrypted elements Epk(cij) where cij = Φ((Si)j),
using the algorithm given in Sec. 4.2.2, and sends them to all players
(b) chooses a random element bi,j,ℓ (1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k)
(c) for each ciphertext cjℓ, calculate bi,j,ℓ ×h cjℓ (1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k)
7. The players i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) calculate Ujm = (
 n
ℓ=1 bℓ,j,m) ×h cjm (1 ≤ j ≤ n,
1 ≤ m ≤ k)
8. All players decrypt the ciphertexts Uij, so that only player i learns the decryption
ai,j.
For each player i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if ai,j = 0 (1 ≤ j ≤ k), then (Si)j is in his result set.
Figure 5: Threshold Set-Union protocol secure against honest-but-curious adversaries (threshold
contribution variant).
37Protocol: Threshold-Perfect-HBC
Input: There are n ≥ 2 honest-but-curious players, c < n dishonestly colluding, each with
a private input set Si, such that |Si| = k. The players share the secret key sk, to which pk
is the corresponding public key for a homomorphic cryptosystem. The threshold number of
repetitions at which an element appears in the output is t. F is a ﬁxed polynomial of degree
t − 1 which has no roots representing elements of P. The threshold number of repetitions
at which an element appears in the output is t ≥ 2. F0,...,Ft−1 are ﬁxed polynomials
of degree 0,...,t − 1 which have no common factors or roots representing elements of P.
IsEq(C,C′) = 1 if the ciphertexts C,C′ encode the same plaintext, and 0 otherwise.
1. Each player i = 1,...,n calculates the polynomial fi = (x − (Si)1)...(x − (Si)k)
2. Player 1 sends the encryption of the polynomial λ1 = f1 to player 2
3. Each player i = 2,...,n
(a) receives the encryption of the polynomial λi−1 from player i − 1
(b) calculates the encryption of the polynomial λi = λi−1 ∗ fi by utilizing the algo-
rithm given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(c) sends the encryption of the polynomial λi to player i + 1 mod n
4. Player 1 distributes the encryption of the polynomial p = λn =
 n
i=1 fi to players
2,...,c + 1
5. Each player i = 1,...,c + 1
(a) calculates the encryption of the 1,..,t − 1th derivatives of p, denoted
p(1),...,p(t−1), by repeating the algorithm given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(b) chooses random polynomials ri,0,...,ri,t−1 ← Rnk[x]
(c) calculates the encryption of the polynomial
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗ ri,ℓ and sends it to
all other players.
6. Each player i = 1,...,n
(a) evaluates the encryption of the polynomial Φ =
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fℓ ∗
  c+1
i=1 ri,ℓ
 
at
each input (Si)j, obtaining encrypted elements Epk(cij) where cij = Φ((Si)j),
using the algorithm given in Sec. 4.2.2, and sends them to all players
(b) for each i′ = 1,...,n, j = 1,...,k chooses a random number ri′j ← R and
calculates an encrypted element Uij = (ri′j ×h Epk(ci′j)), and sends it to player
i′
(c) calculates the elements for j = 1,...,k
Uij = (r1j ×h Epk(c1j)) +h ... +h (rnj ×h Epk(cnj)) +h Epk((Si)j)
(d) constructs the set Vi = {Uij | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}
7. By using the Shuﬄe protocol, all players perform shuﬄing on their private input sets
Vi, obtaining the set U′.
8. For each shuﬄed ciphertext U′
ℓ with arbitrary ordering index ℓ ∈ [nk], the players
i = 1,...,n
(a) each player i chooses random elements qi,ℓ ← R
(b) calculate Wℓ = U′
ℓ +h Epk
 
(
 n
i=1 qi,ℓ)(IsEq(U′
ℓ,U′
ℓ−1) +     + IsEq(U′
ℓ,U′
1))
 
9. All players 1,...,n decrypt each ciphertext Wℓ, obtaining an element aℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ nk).
If aj ∈ P (1 ≤ j ≤ k), then aj is a member of the result set.
Figure 6: Threshold Set-Union protocol secure against honest-but-curious adversaries (perfect vari-
ant).
38Protocol: Set-Intersection-Mal
Input: There are n ≥ 2 players, each with a private input set Si, such that |Si| = k.
The players share the secret key sk, to which pk is the corresponding public key to a
homomorpic cryptosystem. The commitment scheme used in this protocol is a equivocal
commitment scheme; each player holds all data necessary for this scheme.
All players verify the correctness of all proofs sent to them, and stop participating in the
protocol if any are not correct.
Each player i = 1,...,n:
1. (a) calculates the polynomial fi such that the k roots of the polynomial are the
elements of Si, as fi = (x − (Si)1)...(x − (Si)k)
(b) sends δi, the encryption of the polynomial fi to all other players along with
proofs of plaintext knowledge for all coeﬃcients except the leading coeﬃcient
(POPK{(δi)j}, 0 ≤ j < k).
(c) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
i. chooses a random polynomial ri,j ← Rk[x]
ii. sends a commitment to Λ(ri,j) to all players, where Λ(ri,j) = Epk(ri,j)
2. for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
(a) opens the commitment to Λ(ri,j)
(b) veriﬁes proofs of plaintext knowledge for the encrypted coeﬃcients of fj
(c) sets the leading encrypted coeﬃcient (for xk) to a known encryption of 1
(d) calculates  , the encryption of the polynomial pi,j = fj ∗ ri,j with proofs of
correct multiplication ZKPK{ri,j | (  = ri,j ∗h δj) ∧ (Λ(ri,j) = Epk (ri,j))} and
sends it to all other players
3. All players
(a) calculate the encryption of the polynomial p =
 n
i=1
 n
j=1 pi,j =
 n
i=1 fi∗(rj,i)
as in Sec. 4.2.2, and veriﬁes all attached proofs
(b) perform a group decryption to obtain the polynomial p, and distribute proofs
of correct decryption
Each player i = 1,...,n determines the intersection multiset as follows: for each a ∈ Si, he
calculates b such that (x − a)b|p ∧ (x − a)b+1   |p. The element a appears b times in the
intersection multiset.
Figure 7: Set-Intersection protocol for the malicious case.
39Protocol: Cardinality-Mal
Input: There are n ≥ 2 players, each with a private input set Si, such that |Si| = k.
The players share the secret key sk, to which pk is the corresponding public key to a
homomorpic cryptosystem. The commitment scheme used in this protocol is a equivocal
commitment scheme; each player holds all data necessary for this scheme.
All players verify the correctness of all proofs sent to them, and stop participating in the
protocol if any are not correct.
Each player i = 1,...,n:
1. (a) calculates the polynomial fi such that the k roots of the polynomial are the
elements of Si, as fi = (x − (Si)1)...(x − (Si)k)
(b) sends:
i. encrypted elements yi,1 = Epk((Si)1),...,yi,k = Epk((Si)k) to all other
players, along with proofs of plaintext knowledge (POPK{Epk(yi,j)}, 1 ≤
j < k)
ii. sends δi, the encryption of the polynomial fi to all
other players, along with a proof of correct construction
ZKPK



a1,...,ak
 
 
 
 
   
τi = ((x − a1) ∗h ... ∗h (x − ak−1) ∗h α)
∧ yi,1 = Epk(a1) ∧     ∧ yi,k = Epk(ak)
∧ α = Epk(x − ak)



(c) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
i. chooses a random polynomial ri,j ← Rk[x]
ii. sends a commitment to Λ(ri,j) to all players, where Λ(ri,j) = Epk(ri,j)
2. for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
(a) opens the commitment to Λ(ri,j)
(b) veriﬁes proofs of plaintext knowledge for the encrypted coeﬃcients of fj
(c) sets the leading encrypted coeﬃcient (for xk) to a known encryption of 1
(d) calculates τi,j, the encryption of the polynomial pi,j = fj ∗ ri,j, with proofs
of correct multiplication ZKPK{ri,j | (τi,j = ri,j ∗h δj) ∧ (Λ(ri,j) = Epk (ri,j))}
and sends it to all other players
3. Each player i = 1,...,n:
(a) calculates  , the encryption of the polynomial p =
 n
i=1
 n
j=1 pi,j, as in
Sec. 4.2.2, and veriﬁes all attached proofs
(b) evaluates the encryption of the polynomial p at each input (Si)j, obtaining
encrypted elements Epk(cij) where cij = p((Si)j), using the algorithm given in
Sec. 4.2.2.
(c) for each j ∈ [k] chooses a random element rij, calculates an encrypted el-
ement (Vi)j = rij ×h Epk(cij), with attached proof of correct construc-
tion ZKPK{(rij,z) | ((Vi)j = rij ×h  (z)) ∧ (yi,j = Epk(z))}, and sends the en-
crypted element (Vi)j and the proof of correct construction to all players
4. All players perform the Shuﬄe protocol on the sets Vi, obtaining a joint set V , in
which all ciphertexts have been re-randomized.
5. All players 1,...,n decrypt each element of the shuﬄed set V (and send proofs of
correct decryption to all other players)
If nb of the decrypted elements from V are 0, then the size of the set intersection is b.
Figure 8: Cardinality set-intersection protocol for the malicious case.
40Protocol: OverThreshold-Mal
Input: There are n ≥ 2 players, c < n maliciously colluding, each with a private input set
Si, such that |Si| = k. The players share the secret key sk, to which pk is the corresponding
public key to a homomorpic cryptosystem. The commitment scheme used in this protocol is a
equivocal commitment scheme; each player holds all data necessary for this scheme. The threshold
number of repetitions at which an element appears in the output is t. F0,...,Ft−1 are ﬁxed
polynomials of degree 0,...,t−1 which have no common factors or roots representing elements of P.
All players verify the correctness of all proofs sent to them, and refuse to participate in the protocol
if any are not correct.
Each player i = 1,...,n:
1. Each player i = 1,...,n calculates the polynomial fi = (x − (Si)1)...(x − (Si)k)
2. Players 1,...,c + 1 send commitments to yi,1,...,yi,k to all players, where yi,j = Epk((Si)j)
(1 ≤ j ≤ k). All players then open these commitments.
3. Player 1 sends to all other players: encrypted elements y1,1 = Epk((S1)1),...,y1,k =
Epk((S1)k), along with proofs of plaintext knowledge (POPK{Epk(y1,j)}, 1 ≤ j < k); τ1,
the encryption of the polynomial λ1 = f1 to all other players, along with a proof of correct
construction ZKPK



a1,...,ak
 
 
 
   
 
τ1 = ((x − a1) ∗h ... ∗h (x − ak−1) ∗h α)
∧ y1,1 = Epk(a1) ∧     ∧ y1,k = Epk(ak)
∧ α = Epk(x − ak)



4. Each player i = 2,...,n
(a) receives τi, the encryption of the polynomial λi−1, from player i − 1
(b) sends to all other players: encrypted elements yi,1 = Epk((Si)1),...,yi,k = Epk((Si)k),
along with proofs of plaintext knowledge (POPK{Epk(yi,j)}, 1 ≤ j < k); τi, the en-
cryption of the polynomial λi = fi ∗ λi−1, along with a proof of correct construction
ZKPK
 
a1,...,ak
   
 
 
τi = ((x − a1) ∗h ... ∗h (x − ak) ∗h τi−1)
∧ yi,1 = Epk(a1) ∧     ∧ yi,k = Epk(ak)
 
5. Each player i = 1,...,c + 1
(a) choose random polynomials ri,0, ...,ri,t−1 ← Rk[x]
(b) for ℓ = 0,...,t − 1, calculate αℓ the encryption of the ℓth derivative of p = λn, denoted
p(ℓ), by repeating the algorithm given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(c) calculate αi,ℓ, the encryption of the polynomial pℓ ∗ ri,ℓ, for 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ t − 1 and
send them to all other players, along with proofs of correct polynomial multiplication,
ZKPK
 
ri,ℓ
    αi,ℓ = ri,ℓ ∗h p(ℓ) 
6. Each player i = 1,...,n:
(a) calculates  , the encryption of the polynomial Φ =
 t−1
ℓ=0 p(ℓ) ∗ Fj ∗
  c+1
i=0 ri,ℓ
 
, as in
Sec. 4.2.2, and veriﬁes all attached proofs
(b) evaluates the encryption of the polynomial Φ at each input (Si)j, obtaining encrypted
elements Epk(cij) where cij = p((Si)j), using the algorithm given in Sec. 4.2.2.
(c) for each j ∈ [k] chooses a random element rij ← R, calculates an encrypted ele-
ment (Vi)j = (rij ×h Epk(cij)) + (Si)j, with attached proof of correct construction
ZKPK{(rij,z) | ((Vi)j = (rij ×h  (z)) + z) ∧ (yi,j = Epk(z))}, and sends the encrypted
element (Vi)j and the proof of correct construction to all players
7. All players perform the Shuﬄe protocol on the sets Vi, obtaining a joint set V , in which all
ciphertexts have been re-randomized, then jointly decrypt each element of the shuﬄed set V
(and send proofs of correct decryption to all other players).
Each element a ∈ P that appears b times in V is an element in the threshold set that appears b
times in the players’ private inputs.
Figure 9: Over-threshold set-intersection protocol for the malicious case. 41T
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Figure 10: A simulation proof deﬁnes the behavior of the player G, who translates between the
malicious players Γ, who believe they are operating in the real model, and the ideal model, in which
the trusted third party computes the desired answer.
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